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ABSTRACT 
  Antitrust law accepts the competitive marketplace, its operation, 
and its outcomes as an ideal. Society itself need not and does not. 
Although antitrust is not in the business of evaluating, for example, 
the “fairness” of prices, society can, and frequently does, properly 
concern itself with these issues. When dissatisfaction results, it may 
manifest itself in an expressive boycott: a form of social campaign 
wherein purchasers express their dissatisfaction by collectively 
refusing to buy. Antitrust should neither participate in nor censor 
such normative discourse. In this Article, I explain how antitrust law 
impedes this speech, argue why it should not, and provide a 
 
Copyright © 2010 by Hillary Greene. 
 † Associate Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. J.D. Yale Law 
School, B.A. Yale College. I am grateful to participants at the AALS Annual Meeting, Session: 
Antitrust Limits on Patent and Copyright, the University of Minnesota Law School’s Second 
Annual Intellectual Property Scholarship Roundtable, and Southwestern Law School’s Faculty 
Speaker Series for useful input on an earlier version of the Article. Particular thanks extend to 
Floyd Abrams, William Adkinson, Loftus Becker, Bethany R. Berger, Simon Canick, Geoffrey 
Dellenbaugh, Michael Fischl, Kaaryn Gustafson, James D. Hurwitz, Mark Lemley, Kathleen 
Lombardi, Hugh C. Macgill, Patricia A. McCoy, Thomas Morawetz, Sachin Pandya, Jeremy 
Paul, Anthony So, Spencer Weber Waller, Marc L. Winerman, and to research assistants 
Yikkan Chan and Rebecca Ullman. Finally, I am indebted to the editors at the Duke Law 
Journal for their excellent work and, in particular, to M. Rhead Enion, for his exceptional 
stewardship of this Article. This Article was selected for presentation at the Next Generation of 
Antitrust Scholarship Conference (NYU School of Law, 2010). 
GREENE IN FINAL 2/10/2010  9:09:32 PM 
1038 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:1037 
framework that accommodates both First Amendment and antitrust 
values. 
  The expressive boycotts this Article addresses are characterized by 
speech that is political yet also economically self-interested. The 
boycotts discussed involve scientists protesting research tool 
purveyors, doctors protesting pharmaceutical companies, and 
academics and librarians protesting for-profit publishers. The legal 
regimes that govern such undertakings, First Amendment and 
antitrust law, have proven inept in addressing this phenomenon, 
which lies at their intersection. I attribute their shortcomings to a 
combination of the First Amendment’s excessive reliance upon 
categorization and antitrust’s unduly narrow reliance on economic 
efficiency. I then craft a recommendation for handling these 
expressive boycotts that will help ensure that speech about the market 
can be as free as the market itself. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Antitrust law accepts the competitive marketplace, its operation, 
and its outcomes as the ideal. Society itself need not and does not. So, 
although antitrust is not in the business of evaluating the “fairness” of 
prices, for example, society can, and frequently does, properly 
concern itself with these issues. When dissatisfaction results, it may 
manifest itself in an expressive boycott, which is a form of social 
campaign wherein purchasers express their dissatisfaction by 
collectively refusing to buy. Antitrust should neither participate in 
nor censor such normative discourse. In this Article, I explain how 
antitrust law may impede this speech, argue why it should not, and 
provide a framework that accommodates both First Amendment and 
antitrust values. I examine this value conflict with particular emphasis 
on situations that involve intellectual property. 
The expressive boycotts that this Article addresses are 
characterized by speech that is political yet also economically self-
interested. What law governs such undertakings? Unfortunately, both 
the First Amendment and antitrust legal regimes have proven inept at 
addressing the phenomenon of expressive boycotts, which lies at their 
intersection. This shortcoming reflects, in the first instance, the 
difficulty of placing those expressive boycotts into the existing legal 
categories of speech. Prevailing law, for better or worse, relies heavily 
on categorization to determine the degree of First Amendment 
protection afforded to particular speech. Sometimes, however, the 
law may mischaracterize speech, forcing it into a box that does not 
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quite fit. Without sufficient First Amendment protection, expressive 
speech is rendered unduly vulnerable to the application of the 
antitrust laws. Antitrust law, with its primary emphasis on economic 
efficiency, accords no value to the speech at issue—in much the same 
manner that it largely disregards any noneconomic consideration. 
Perhaps nothing more poignantly illustrates the peculiar 
jurisprudential straits in which society finds itself than revisiting a 
celebrated series of boycotts in American history armed with 
contemporary case law. The colonial boycotts of British merchants 
are often held out as examples of the noble and powerful role of 
boycotts. John Hancock, for example, played a key role in organizing 
those boycotts.1 Ironically, however, Hancock’s celebrated rabble-
rousing conduct might have been chilled under modern antitrust law. 
Hancock was a wealthy merchant whose business was decimated by 
the import taxes imposed by the British government2 as well as the 
lack of taxes imposed on the East India Company, which could then 
easily undersell merchants such as Hancock.3 Whatever his more 
noble aspirations, Hancock had a profound economic interest in the 
boycotts.4 Under current antitrust law, he and other merchant 
boycotters might have been condemned. Hancock’s organization and 
participation in the boycott would not constitute political speech 
owing to the presence of economic self-interest on his part and, 
therefore, would not warrant First Amendment protection. Colonial 
history aside, one need look no further than to contemporary events 
to discover numerous instances of collective action that are legally 
dubious from an antitrust perspective yet brimming with expressive 
value. 
In 1990, a New York Times article declared boycotts to be “[a] 
[g]rowth [i]ndustry.”5 Ten years later, the newspaper observed that 
 
 1.  See HARLOW GILES UNGER, JOHN HANCOCK: MERCHANT KING AND AMERICAN 
PATRIOT 97–100, 106–07, 112–13, 131–32 (2000) (analyzing the roles of both politics and 
economic self-interest in Hancock’s boycott activities). 
 2.  Id. at 83. 
 3.  Id. at 164. 
 4.  Id. at 99; see also CLAUDE H. VAN TYNE, THE CAUSES OF THE WAR OF 
INDEPENDENCE 377 (1922) (“Since the public would actually profit as far as the cost of its tea 
was concerned, the injured merchants were careful not to confine their agitation too closely to 
the true issue of their own prospective losses.”). 
 5.  Anthony Ramirez, From Coffee to Tobacco, Boycotts Are a Growth Industry, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 3, 1990, at E2. 
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more groups are pursuing boycotts than at any time since the 1970s.6 
“While people are participating less in the political process, as 
consumers they see that one way they can exercise power is by where 
they spend their money and where they don’t.”7 The increase in these 
boycotts has been attributed to many, sometimes interrelated, factors 
ranging from “greater public attention to corporate social 
responsibility . . . and the increased vulnerability of brands and 
corporate reputations”8 to the power of the Internet.9 And it would 
not be surprising if, in this current climate of heightened skepticism 
regarding the functioning of the markets, backlash via boycotts 
further increases. 
Within the broader jurisprudential concern of reconciling First 
Amendment and antitrust considerations in the context of expressive 
yet economically rewarding boycotts is the complicated issue of how 
to accomplish this task in light of the increasing centrality of 
intellectual property in individuals’ professional lives and society’s 
welfare as a whole. 
Consider the following public plea: “[The publisher] is breaking 
an unwritten contract with the scientific community: being a publisher 
of our research carries the responsibility to make our contributions 
publicly available at reasonable rates. As an academic community, it 
is time that we reassert our values.”10 So read the public letter of two 
professors who called for several collective actions including a 
boycott of the publisher in question.11 Similarly, scientific researchers 
who use mice in studying illness were angered when DuPont, which 
had an exclusive patent license for a genetically engineered mouse 
(Oncomouse), charged what they deemed an excessive price for the 
mouse and also imposed unusually restrictive conditions for sharing 
among researchers. Nobel Prize–winning scientist Harold Varmus 
 
 6.  Steven Greenhouse, A Weapon for Consumers: The Boycott Returns, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
26, 2000, § 4 (Week in Review), at 4. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Jill Gabrielle Klein, N. Craig Smith & Andrew John, Why We Boycott: Consumer 
Motivations for Boycott Participation and Marketer Responses 1 (Ctr. for Mktg., London Bus. 
Sch., Working Paper No. 03-702, 2003), available at http://www.london.edu/facultyandresearch/ 
research/docs/03-702.pdf. 
 9.  Behrang Rezabakhsh et al., Consumer Power: A Comparison of the Old Economy and 
the Internet Economy, 29 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 3, 15 (2006). 
 10.  Open Letter from Peter Walter & Keith Yamamoto, Mission Bay Governance Comm., 
Univ. of Cal., S.F. (undated), available at http://stlq.info/2003/10/call_for_boycott_of_cell_press. 
html. 
 11.  For a discussion of the academic publishing controversy, see infra Part IV.C. 
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denounced these conditions as “abhorrent,” and he and fellow 
researchers “went on the warpath.”12 
The view of the participants in these and many other boycott 
efforts is that they were merely seeking to enforce an “invisible 
handshake” whereby community norms of fairness and other shared 
values—not merely those of the marketplace—determine the terms of 
trade.13 At the core of these boycotts was the desire to debate the 
market outcome as well as to potentially transform it. The source of 
that change could be persuasion on the merits or concern with public 
image, or it could result from economic coercion based on the 
boycotters’ collective market power. Are these boycotts exercises of 
free speech or examples of antitrust violations, and how should the 
law address them? 
Albert Hirschman’s famous characterization of the options 
available to disenchanted market participants constitutes a useful 
point of reference for any examination of boycotts. Hirschman 
posited that such purchasers had three options: exit (“go over to the 
competition”), voice (“‘kick up a fuss’ and thereby force 
improve[ments]”),14 or boycott (a hybrid of exit and voice).15 Voice is 
interpreted as “any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape 
from, an objectionable state of affairs,” and it can take the form of 
“individual or collective petition” or “various types of actions and 
protests, including those that are meant to mobilize public opinion.”16 
Threatened and consummated boycotts lie on “the border line 
between voice and exit.”17 In those instances, either the threat of exit 
or the promise of reentry are “instrument[s] of voice,” respectively.18 
Exit and voice are “market and nonmarket forces, that is, economic 
and political mechanisms.”19 The academic publishing and 
Oncomouse examples illustrate concretely how boycotts combine 
these two approaches. Given the particular significance of the speech 
 
 12.  Eliot Marshall, A Deluge of Patents Creates Legal Hassles for Research, 288 SCIENCE 
255, 256 (2000). For a discussion of the Oncomouse controversy, see infra Part IV.A. 
 13.  See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairness as a Constraint on 
Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 736 (1986) (finding that 
transactors may avoid doing business with firms whose behavior is perceived as unfair). 
 14.  ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 30 (1970). 
 15.  Id. at 86. 
 16.  Id. at 30. 
 17.  Id. at 86. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. at 19. 
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(voice) interest in fomenting public discourse, this Article calls these 
expressive boycotts.20 
Part I of this Article briefly discusses the key First Amendment 
and antitrust concepts that provide the basic framework for analysis. 
Part II then examines four key cases involving boycotts characterized 
by a wide range of speech interests and potential antitrust issues. 
These cases underscore both the centrality of categorization within 
First Amendment law and the failure of the existing categories to 
meaningfully accommodate the speech interest in the expressive 
boycotts at issue. As such, the law inadequately protects the speech 
interests associated with expressive boycotts when those interests are 
inextricably intertwined with economic coercion—the concern of 
antitrust law. Part III argues that expressive boycotts constitute a 
unique form of speech that merits First Amendment protection, and 
Part IV provides four examples of intellectual property boycotts. Part 
V offers recommendations for reviewing expressive boycotts that will 
help ensure that speech about the market can be as free as the market 
itself. 
I.  LEGAL BASICS 
Expressive boycotts pose unique challenges because they can be 
vehicles for both the exchange of ideas and economic coercion. Not 
surprisingly, then, the First Amendment, the Sherman Antitrust Act, 
and a slew of judicial rulings provide the complex backdrop against 
which such boycotts must be considered. Part I briefly introduces the 
basic contours of these two legal regimes. Antitrust analysis entails 
frequent recourse to making tradeoffs regarding economic efficiency. 
Moreover, such tradeoffs lie at the core of antitrust’s primary mode of 
analysis—the rule of reason. First Amendment law, by contrast, 
eschews tradeoffs per se in favor of an intermittently acknowledged, 
and often contested, “balancing” process. Parts II and III 
demonstrate that what is most important is the extent to which each 
regime does or does not account for the values of the other and the 
viability of legal outcomes that do not entail one regime entirely 
trumping the other regime. Unfortunately, despite the potential for 
flexibility inherent in both areas of law, neither legal regime exhibits 
flexibility when expressive boycotts are at issue. 
 
 20.  See, e.g., FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 437 (1990) 
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (using the same terminology). 
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A. First Amendment 
The First Amendment commands that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”21 Despite its 
uncompromising language, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes has 
stated, the First Amendment, “obviously was not[] intended to give 
immunity for every possible use of language.”22 If society does not 
protect all speech absolutely, the questions become what speech is 
protected and what is the nature of that protection? The purpose of 
this Section is not to present the complexities and inconsistencies of 
First Amendment law,23 but rather to introduce the most relevant 
First Amendment issues given the expressive boycotts at issue. This 
Section briefly delineates three general modes of First Amendment 
analysis and then considers two key factors within that overarching 
framework: the content of the speech at issue and whether conduct is 
also involved. 
1. Frameworks.  Professor Mark Tushnet helpfully delineates 
three dominant methods of First Amendment analysis used by the 
courts.24 The “inside-outside” mode of analysis distinguishes speech 
that is “inside,” over which restrictions are “presumptively 
unconstitutional,” from speech that is “outside,” over whose 
restrictions receive “no special First Amendment scrutiny.”25 A 
second analytical mode is the “‘onion-layer’ [approach], in which 
categories of speech receive different degrees of protection[, or] 
‘standards of scrutiny.’”26 The primary divergence from the inside-
outside mode is the introduction of an additional, intermediate 
category “within the ambit of the first amendment” but “ascrib[ed] 
less-than-full protection.”27 A third mode, through a different form of 
intermediate scrutiny, addresses expressive conduct and evaluates 
“content-neutral restrictions” by directly balancing “the impairment 
 
 21.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 22.  Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919). 
 23.  For an overview of the First Amendment law’s complexities, see 1 RODNEY A. 
SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2:64 (2009). 
 24.  Mark Tushnet, Heller and the Perils of Compromise, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 419, 
422–23 (2009). 
 25.  Id. at 422. 
 26.  Id. at 423. 
 27.  Keith Werhan, The O’Briening of Free Speech Methodology, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 635, 661 
n.157, 662 n.159 (1987). 
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of expression against the degree to which the regulation accomplishes 
the government’s permissible purposes.”28 
2. Content.  In both the first and second modes of First 
Amendment analysis, the content of the particular speech at issue 
directly informs how it is categorized and, as a consequence, the 
extent of its protection. The second mode, which entails different 
standards of scrutiny, dominates First Amendment law today.29 The 
lowest level of scrutiny takes the form of a “minimal rationality 
standard” and will typically allow the restraint of speech.30 Obscenity 
is a category of speech receiving this meager scrutiny—hence it can be 
prohibited.31 Intermediate scrutiny requires that the restriction on 
speech serve a “substantial [governmental] interest” and be “designed 
carefully to achieve [that end].”32 This level of scrutiny applies to 
commercial speech which “[t]he Constitution . . . accords a lesser 
protection . . . than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.”33 
The strongest level of protection, heightened scrutiny, requires the 
restriction on speech to protect a “compelling state interest” and 
employ means “narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”34 Political 
speech traditionally receives this highest level of First Amendment 
protection. The Supreme Court has noted that there is “practically 
universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment 
[is] to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”35 
Political speech is the paradigmatic example of the content that 
the First Amendment strives to protect. Nonetheless, that category of 
speech is not coterminous with the bounds of speech to which 
heightened scrutiny applies. The Supreme Court has expressly held 
that “[n]othing in the First Amendment or our cases discussing its 
meaning makes the question whether the adjective ‘political’ can 
properly be attached to those beliefs the critical constitutional 
 
 28.  Tushnet, supra note 24, at 423. 
 29.  See 1 SMOLLA, supra note 23, § 2:63 (describing the differing levels of scrutiny applied 
by the Supreme Court). 
 30.  Id. § 3:2. 
 31.  Id. § 2:69 (noting that obscene speech “receives no First Amendment protection”). 
 32.  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980). 
 33.  Id. at 562–63 (citation omitted). Commercial speech is “expression related solely to the 
economic interests of the speaker and its audience” and typically applies to speech that 
“propos[es] a commercial transaction.” Id. at 561–62. 
 34.  Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 
(1991) (quoting Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987)). 
 35.  Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). 
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inquiry.”36 Moreover, the Supreme Court, in numerous contexts 
besides antitrust, has held unequivocally that the First Amendment 
protects speech concerning any number of nonpolitical issues. “[T]he 
First Amendment does not protect speech and assembly only to the 
extent it can be characterized as political. . . . ‘And the rights of free 
speech and a free press are not confined to any field of human 
interest.’”37 More specifically, the Court has held that a nonexhaustive 
list of topics for which expression would be entitled to “full First 
Amendment protection” includes “philosophical, social, artistic, 
economic, literary, or ethical matters.”38 Protected speech need not be 
political either in content or in context (namely, government 
petitioning). 
The Petition Clause . . . was inspired by the same ideals of liberty 
and democracy that gave us the freedoms to speak, publish, and 
assemble. These First Amendment rights are inseparable and there 
is no sound basis for granting greater constitutional protection to 
statements made in a petition . . . than other First Amendment 
expressions.39 
3. Conduct.  Speech can be analyzed not only by its content, but 
also by its form. When speech mixes with conduct, it forms a hybrid 
termed “expressive conduct.”40 “What is ‘speech’ in the constitutional 
sense?”41 In exploring this fundamental issue, Frederick Schauer has 
noted that what the Constitution actually protects is in some regards 
broader than the “ordinary language meaning of the word ‘speech.’”42 
Conduct undertaken for expressive purposes, such as flag burning, 
can constitute speech warranting First Amendment protection.43 The 
conduct that this Article addresses, boycotting, is frequently a 
 
 36.  Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 232 (1977). 
 37.  United Mine Workers, Dist. 12 v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967) 
(citation omitted). 
 38.  Abood, 431 U.S. at 231. 
 39.  McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 485 (1985) (citations omitted). 
 40.  1 SMOLLA, supra note 23, § 11:7. 
 41.  Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 
VAND. L. REV. 265, 279 (1981). 
 42.  Id. at 273 (citing Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918)). 
 43.  1 SMOLLA, supra note 23, § 11:1 (The Supreme Court has “long recognized that First 
Amendment protection for speech extends to more than the use of language”); id. §§ 11:9, 11:18 
(discussing the “quintessential symbolic speech problem” of flag desecration and observing that 
“[l]aws banning the desecration of flags . . . will normally fail [to pass constitutional muster]”). 
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multifaceted undertaking that entails agreement not to purchase a 
particular good. 
United States v. O’Brien44 is the seminal case regarding content-
neutral restrictions on expressive conduct. O’Brien directs courts to 
evaluate whether the restriction at issue “furthers an important or 
substantial government interest; if the government interest is 
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental 
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is 
essential to the furtherance of that interest.”45 O’Brien balancing 
permits legitimate conduct regulations even when that conduct is 
intertwined with expression. Moreover, “so-called ‘O’Brien 
balancing’” contributed to the development of the aforementioned 
intermediate scrutiny standard applicable to commercial speech.46 
Within First Amendment law, and constitutional law more generally, 
a longstanding debate exists regarding the relationship and relative 
merits of balancing and categorical analysis.47 Whether for better or 
for worse, O’Brien’s approach permits the Court to provide “some, 
but not full protection to a category of speech over which the Court 
feels ambivalent.”48 For the expressive boycotts at issue in this Article, 
the source of judicial malaise is clearly the desire to protect antitrust 
values. 
* * * 
Part II explores what First Amendment protections, if any, have 
been accorded to economic boycotts undertaken for political 
purposes as well as potential pecuniary gain. As this Article 
demonstrates, notwithstanding the complexity of First Amendment 
law generally, within the antitrust context judicial rulings regarding 
expressive boycotts are relatively simple and overly simplistic. 
 
 44.  United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 45.  Id. at 377. 
 46.  Werhan, supra note 27, at 637. 
 47.  Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and 
Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 294–95 (1992) (“Attitudes about which is better—
categorization or balancing—have fluctuated over time. . . . oscillat[ing] in an endless 
dialectic . . . .”). 
 48.  Werhan, supra note 27, at 663. 
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B. Antitrust 
Although “not constitutional in origin,” the significance of 
antitrust law should not be understated.49 The Supreme Court has 
characterized antitrust laws as “the Magna Carta of free enterprise. 
They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and 
our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of 
our fundamental personal freedoms.”50 This Section briefly delineates 
how antitrust law evaluates boycotts—collective actions undertaken 
by market participants to influence the decisions (particularly those 
regarding pricing) of other market participants.51 Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act supplies the relevant antitrust stricture and prohibits 
any “contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade.”52 
The primary judicial gloss on that language has been to read into it 
the requirement that the prohibited restraints be “unreasonable.”53 
This Article treats a conventional Sherman Act Section 1 antitrust 
case as one in which no credible speech argument can be made. 
Consider, for example, the proverbial smoke-filled room in which 
competitors fix prices or divide markets. For instant purposes, the key 
features of Section 1 are the conspiracy requirement, the role of per 
se versus rule of reason analysis, and the offense of price fixing. 
1. Conspiracy.  Section 1 addresses unreasonable restraints 
resulting from concerted, as opposed to unilateral, acts. As such, “the 
antitrust plaintiff should present direct or circumstantial evidence that 
reasonably tends to prove that the [conspirators] ‘had a conscious 
 
 49.  See James D. Hurwitz, Abuse of Governmental Processes, the First Amendment, and 
the Boundaries of Noerr, 74 GEO. L.J. 65, 120 (1985) (“Competition policy, while not 
constitutional in origin, has a bearing that is only slightly less eminent.”). Hurwitz attributes 
competition policy’s “eminence . . . [to] the fact that one of the most critical foundations of a 
strong democracy is a strong economy . . . and competition has been designated as the 
protecting and guiding force for the economy.” Id. 
 50.  United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (referring to the 
Sherman Antitrust Act). 
 51.  See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 536 (1978) (“In 
antitrust law, a boycott is a ‘concerted refusal to deal’ with a disfavored purchaser or seller.” 
(quoting Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 555 F.2d 3, 7 (1st Cir. 1977))). For an analysis 
of the different types of boycotts and concerted refusals to deal more generally, see LAWRENCE 
A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 
295–315 (2d ed. 2006). 
 52.  15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 53.  State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (“Although the Sherman Act, by its terms, 
prohibits every agreement ‘in restraint of trade,’ this Court has long recognized that Congress 
intended to outlaw only unreasonable restraints.”). 
GREENE IN FINAL 2/10/2010  9:09:32 PM 
2010] ANTITRUST CENSORSHIP 1049 
commitment to a common scheme.’”54 Stated alternatively, 
“[c]ircumstances must reveal ‘a unity of purpose or a common design 
and understanding, or a meeting of minds in an unlawful 
arrangement.’”55 
In conventional antitrust cases, the conspirators strive to conceal 
their joint conduct rather than “seek notoriety” such as through press 
coverage “both because they seek to escape detection and because 
they have no wider audience beyond the participants and the 
target.”56 By contrast, the boycotts at issue in this Article are 
expressive and, therefore, often typified by very public, jointly 
undertaken activities including petitions and statements to the press. 
As such, whereas establishing a conspiracy often constitutes an 
extremely challenging hurdle to those bringing conventional antitrust 
actions, this requirement is likely to be deemed self-evidently satisfied 
for expressive boycotts.57 
2. Unreasonable Restraints.  Assuming arguendo the existence of 
a conspiracy, the next step in the antitrust analysis is to discern the 
type of allegedly anticompetitive restraint at issue. One consequence 
that often flows from this determination is identifying whether per se 
(automatic condemnation for inherently suspect conduct) or rule of 
reason (balancing of pro- and anticompetitive effects) analysis is 
warranted. The mere designation of a boycott, also termed a 
concerted refusal to deal, typically provides an insufficient basis for 
determining the proper legal analysis.58 Although “there is often no 
bright line separating per se from [r]ule of [r]eason analysis,”59 the 
determination of which legal standard applies often has profound 
 
 54.  Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984) (quoting Edward J. 
Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 111 (3d Cir. 1980)). 
 55.  Id. (quoting Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946)); see also 
Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954) 
(“Circumstantial evidence of consciously parallel behavior may have made heavy inroads into 
the traditional judicial attitude toward conspiracy; but ‘conscious parallelism’ has not yet read 
conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely.”). 
 56.  FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 451 (1990) (Brennan, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 57.  For a discussion that questions the wisdom of these applications, see infra Part V.A.2. 
 58.  See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 542–43 (1978) (noting 
the “marked lack of uniformity in defining” the term “boycott” for purposes of the Sherman 
Act). 
 59.  NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.26 (1984) (“Per se rules may require 
considerable inquiry into market conditions before the evidence justifies a presumption of 
anticompetitive conduct.”). 
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consequences on the ultimate outcome, particularly when, as in the 
expressive boycotts at issue in this Article, free speech concerns are 
implicated. 
3. Per Se.  Conduct subject to per se condemnation is that 
deemed both inherently pernicious in terms of its anticompetitive 
effects and lacking in redeeming procompetitive effects.60 As such, it 
is “conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal 
without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm [it has] caused or the 
business excuse for [its] use.”61 A boycott would be deemed per se 
illegal if, for example, it is among horizontal competitors meant to 
disadvantage a competitor62 or it furthers a price-fixing scheme.63 Price 
fixing is considered so harmful to society that it is one of the few 
antitrust offenses subject to criminal as well as civil sanctions. It is 
important to understand the rationale for this treatment, the breadth 
of conduct that constitutes price fixing, and the unavailability of 
certain defenses. 
Pricing is often referred to as “the central nervous system of the 
economy.”64 Harm to that vital system, therefore, is not narrowly 
confined to conspiracies geared to establish a specific price in lieu of 
the price determined by the market. Any agreements undertaken to 
interfere with the marketplace as a pricing mechanism, whether they 
be for “raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing” prices, are 
per se illegal.65 Because price fixing is per se illegal, conspirators’ 
actual or likely ability to affect prices is irrelevant. It is no defense to 
argue that a conspiracy enjoys no market power.66 Consequently, a 
boycott undertaken in response to price levels, but lacking market 
power, would be condemned under the antitrust laws. Another 
nondefense is the alleged reasonableness or fairness of the pricing 
 
 60.  N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1939) (finding that activities are 
unreasonable “because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming 
virtue”). 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  E. States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914). 
 63.  FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 434 (1990) (noting the threat 
posed to the free market). 
 64.  See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil, 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940) 
(discussing the threat of price-fixing agreements). 
 65.  Id. at 223. 
 66.  See id. at 224 n.59 (indicating that market power is not necessary for conviction). 
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advocated or effectuated by the boycotters.67 The principle underlying 
the rejection of such defenses is clear: “The Sherman Act reflects a 
legislative judgment that ultimately competition will produce not only 
lower prices, but also better goods and services. . . . Even assuming 
occasional exceptions to the presumed consequences of competition, 
the statutory policy precludes inquiry into the question whether 
competition is good or bad.”68 
4. Rule of Reason.  Despite the apparent frequency of arguably 
per se illegal acts (price fixing) among expressive boycotters, most 
types of conduct are analyzed under the rule of reason. This balancing 
test requires courts to weigh the pro- and anticompetitive effects of 
the restraint at issue before determining whether it is “unreasonable.” 
Whether a restriction is reasonable or not depends upon how it 
affects consumer welfare. This inquiry into consumer welfare is the 
lodestar of antitrust analysis; it is narrowly defined in economic terms 
and encompasses the price, quantity, and quality of goods offered.69 
The underlying substantive question concerns what pro- versus 
anticompetitive effects are legally cognizable under the antitrust laws. 
The inquiry into anticompetitive effects includes both actual and 
inferred harms. There is little or no recognition of noneconomic 
benefits. 
Depending on the facts of the case, including the duration of the 
alleged misconduct, actual competitive effects such as a change in 
price in response to the conduct at issue may or may not be 
discernable. Consequently, society seeks to identify not only those 
arrangements with demonstrated “detrimental effects” but also those 
with “the potential for genuine adverse effects on competition.”70 
When actual effects are not present or cannot be discerned, courts use 
the market share of the alleged bad actor as a proxy for harm. Either 
a buyer or seller can exercise market power. With regard to sellers, 
the point of view from which it is usually defined, “market power is 
 
 67.  Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 647 (1980) (“It has long been settled 
that an agreement to fix prices is unlawful per se. It is no excuse that the prices fixed are 
themselves reasonable.”). 
 68.  Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978). 
 69.  Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust and Patent Law as Component Parts of Innovation 
Policy, 34 J. CORP. L. 1259, 1264 (2009); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and 
the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 4 (1982) (“[T]he overriding economic goal of 
antitrust laws is to maximize consumer welfare through the efficient allocation of resources.”). 
 70.  FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460–61 (1986). 
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the seller’s ability to raise and sustain a price increase without losing 
so many sales that it must rescind the increase.”71 With regard to 
buyers, therefore, it is a buyer’s ability to force a sustained price 
decrease. Although courts’ “efforts to define market power is still a 
work in progress,” the key feature is “power-over-price.”72 Market 
power, within an antitrust market (defined in terms of both 
geography and product), is a reflection of market share. The market 
share threshold above which market power, and therefore, 
competitive harm, is found varies depending on numerous factors.73 
5. Noneconomic and Other Nonconsiderations.  The law that this 
Article has summarized, with its emphasis on economic analysis, 
illustrates the trend over the last few decades whereby economic 
efficiency has come to thoroughly dominate antitrust analysis74 while 
noneconomic considerations have fallen into disregard and, at times, 
disrepute. This Section briefly explains those dynamics and lays the 
groundwork for understanding their implications for the expressive 
boycotts at issue in this Article. 
Noneconomic considerations could, in theory, encompass all 
factors not directly implicating economic efficiency. In practice, 
however, “noneconomic” typically refers to concerns such as the 
“prosperity of small businesses; . . . autonomy for independent 
business people; [and] political and economic deconcentration.”75 
Professor Robert Pitofsky, among others, has criticized the increasing 
hostility of antitrust to such factors: “It is bad history, bad policy, and 
bad law to exclude certain political values in interpreting the antitrust 
laws.”76 But this general trend, fueled by what is known as the 
Chicago School of antitrust, has become dominant and has largely 
 
 71.  SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 51, at 26. 
 72.  Id. at 29. 
 73.  Id. at 30 (stating that the “tolerance for different levels of market power depend[s] on 
the nature of the violation” and, indirectly, upon the “feasibility of remedial action”). 
 74.  See Thomas L. Greaney, Regulating for Efficiency in Health Care Through the Antitrust 
Laws, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 465, 466–67. 
 75.  Jean Wegman Burns, Vertical Restraints, Efficiency, and the Real World, 62 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 597, 598 n.6 (1993). 
 76.  Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1051 
(1979); see also id. at 1058–60 (elaborating on the criticism). For an introduction to this general 
issue, see John J. Flynn, Antitrust Jurisprudence: A Symposium on the Economic, Political, and 
Social Goals of Antitrust Policy, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1182 (1977). 
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persisted even in a post–Chicago School environment.77 This Article’s 
immediate purpose is not to revisit the philosophical underpinnings of 
those schools of thought but rather to explore some of the more 
practical reasons that Chicago adherents have offered for rejecting 
noneconomic considerations and to apply those insights in contexts in 
which First Amendment and antitrust issues commingle. 
With regard to noneconomic considerations, Judge Frank 
Easterbrook has remarked that: 
Goals based on something other than efficiency (or its close proxy 
consumers’ welfare) really call on judges to redistribute 
income . . . . Judges have no metric, and we ought not attribute to 
Congress a decision to grant judges a political power that lacks any 
semblance of “legal” criteria.78 
Judge Richard Posner shares the sentiment that an economic 
efficiency objective enables judges to develop antitrust rules that are 
“reasonably objective.” 79 He further argues that if courts were to rely 
on noneconomic considerations to develop antitrust law, “they would 
be completely at sea and might also shipwreck the economy.”80 It is, at 
a minimum, unclear that these Chicago School proponents are correct 
regarding either the precision introduced by economic analysis or the 
imprecision that would be introduced by noneconomic 
considerations.81 It is important, however, to recognize this sentiment 
and how, over time, it has resulted in a legal regime that has become 
 
 77.  See William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for 
Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 1 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 4–6 
(2007) (explaining both the utility and the shortcomings of the Chicago School/post–Chicago 
School framework). 
 78.  Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1704 (1986). 
 79.  Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and Interpretation of Statutes and 
the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 211 (1987). 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Pitofsky, supra note 76, at 1060 (“[A]n exclusively economic approach reflects an 
unrealistically optimistic view of the certainty introduced by that kind of analysis, and . . . the 
introduction of non-economic factors does not result in an undue interference with effective 
enforcement.”). 
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increasingly inhospitable to either the recognition82 or reintegration of 
noneconomic considerations.83 
What these judges’ arguments underscore is that, in addition to 
substantive qualms regarding the propriety of recognizing 
noneconomic factors, they view introducing such factors into 
balancing tests as also posing intractable practical challenges. Perhaps 
it is not surprising that, in the two contexts in which antitrust yields to 
constitutional imperatives (petitioning government and federalism), it 
does so by conferring immunity. 
6. Constitutional Considerations.  In addition to protecting free 
speech, the First Amendment also enshrines the right to “petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.”84 And it is within this 
political context that noneconomic constitutional considerations 
typically trump the antitrust laws.85 
In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor 
Freight, Inc.,86 the Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff truckers’ 
argument that the railroads’ “publicity campaign against the 
truckers,” which encouraged legislation beneficial to the railroads and 
harmful to the truckers, violated the antitrust laws.87 It held 
expansively that, “no violation of the [Sherman] Act can be 
predicated upon mere attempts to influence the passage or 
enforcement of the laws.”88 The Sherman Act regulates business 
activity, not political activity.89 The questions of whether a law should 
 
 82.  See Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 BYU 
L. REV. 1265, 1332 n.451 (observing within the rule of reason context that “no courts . . . have 
explicitly invoked noneconomic rationales for their decisions”). 
 83.  See, e.g., Hillary Greene, Guideline Institutionalization: The Role of Merger Guidelines 
in Antitrust Discourse, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 822–23 (2006) (noting that the economic 
framework within merger law is unaccommodating of noneconomic factors). 
 84.  U.S. CONST. amend I. 
 85.  The seminal case on this issue, Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor 
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), arguably based antitrust immunity upon some combination of 
First Amendment considerations and statutory construction of the Sherman Act. Hurwitz, supra 
note 49, at 79 n.46. The Court’s ruling in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 
404 U.S. 508 (1972), “clearly rest[ed] on first amendment principles.” Hurwitz, supra note 49, at 
79 n.46; see also Marina Lao, Reforming the Noerr-Pennington Antitrust Immunity Doctrine, 55 
RUTGERS L. REV. 965, 1002 (2003) (observing that case law suggests Noerr is based on both 
“constitutional principles” and “statutory interpretation” and arguing that “the core of the 
doctrine is constitutional”). 
 86.  E.R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). 
 87.  Id. at 129, 144. 
 88.  Id. at 135. 
 89.  Id. at 140. 
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pass and how it should be enforced were the responsibility of the 
legislative and executive branches of government.90 The United 
States’ representative democracy largely “depends upon the ability of 
the people to make their wishes known to their representatives.”91 
Noerr and its progeny give “primacy to first amendment 
considerations” and subordinate competition policy considerations 
through a broad grant of immunity from antitrust claims regarding 
“efforts to influence legislative, executive, administrative, and 
adjudicatory conduct by government.”92 Notwithstanding the broad 
range of that protection, like the First Amendment upon which it is 
based, Noerr immunity is not absolute. Petitioners’ invocation of 
governmental processes in order to generate competitive burdens 
rather than to “achieve the legitimate outcome of the process 
invoked” constitutes a “sham” and is not immunized.93 
“[T]he boundary between antitrust enforcement and 
constitutionally protected activity” is marked by the state action 
doctrine as well as the Noerr doctrine.94 State action immunity is a 
judicially created doctrine that reflects “the need to subordinate 
national competition policy, as embodied in the Sherman Act, to a 
state’s right to assert regulatory autonomy.”95 In the seminal case 
Parker v. Brown, the Supreme Court observed: 
In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, 
the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally 
subtract from their authority . . . . [t]he Sherman Act makes no 
mention of the state as such, and gives no hint that it was intended 
to restrain state action or official action directed by a state.96 
State action immunity is only available when, among other things, the 
restraint at issue is “one clearly articulated and affirmatively 
 
 90.  Id. at 137. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Hurwitz, supra note 49, at 66; see also Lao, supra note 85, at 972–76 (delineating how 
United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), and California Motor 
Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited expanded Noerr immunity to petitioning of the executive 
and the courts/administrative agencies respectively.). 
 93.  Hurwitz, supra note 49, at 93. 
 94.  Id. at 76. 
 95.  Hillary Greene, Articulating Trade-Offs: The Political Economy of State Action 
Immunity, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 827, 828. 
 96.  Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943). 
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expressed as state policy.”97 It is employed “when antitrust clearly 
could override state law and when the antitrust statutes do not in 
terms defer, but the court thinks state policy warrants greater 
deference than Congress has expressly granted.”98 As such, Professors 
Lawrence Sullivan and Warren Grimes have observed how this 
doctrine “widen[s] the states’ power to impose economic norms.”99 In 
particular, this antitrust exemption “conditions the relationship 
between state law and federal antitrust by factoring into the analysis a 
public interest other than competitive effect: namely the states’ 
interest in such non-competitive goals as its regulation seeks to 
attain.”100 
   * * * 
It is likely that antitrust’s largely binary approach of either 
ignoring or immunizing noneconomic factors contributed to a 
comparable application of First Amendment law in which the stark 
choice of strongly protected versus unprotected speech emerged, and 
a more balanced outcome—regarding speech within this boycott 
context—was not entertained. 
II.  ANTITRUST MONOPOLIZATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
When allegedly, or even indisputably, anticompetitive conduct 
arguably implicates speech concerns, should antitrust law alone be 
dispositive or should the First Amendment have a role to play? 
Unfortunately, when those with some economic interest undertake 
expressive boycotts, First Amendment values are likely forsaken in 
the name of antitrust law’s protection of free enterprise. This Part 
explains the origins of this troubling state of the law. It discusses the 
key cases within this context and highlights how they epitomize a 
categorical approach to the First Amendment and, more specifically, 
 
 97.  Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980). 
The controversy currently surrounding state action immunity reflects the underlying 
disagreement regarding the “appropriate balance between federalism and federal [antitrust] 
policy.” Greene, supra note 95, at 827. Most critics of this doctrine seek to restrict its availability 
and rely, with varying degrees of candor, upon a strictly economic efficiency–based analysis 
instead of grappling openly with the question of what value should be accorded federalism when 
antitrust lies in the balance. Id. at 828. 
 98.  SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 51, at 799. 
 99.  Id. at 800. 
 100.  Id. 
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how the implementation of that approach within the antitrust context 
became skewed and inadequately protective of speech. 
The four key cases discussed in this Part illustrate the extremely 
wide range of circumstances encompassed in the term boycott. The 
identities of the boycotters vary as do their goals and targets. When 
taken individually, each case involves a different combination of these 
basic characteristics and raises different First Amendment issues. 
Collectively, however, these cases underscore the centrality of 
categorization in First Amendment law and the potentially extreme 
consequences when antitrust is also involved. What emerges is a 
boycott continuum of sorts fully dominated, at the extremes, by either 
antitrust or First Amendment values, depending upon whether the 
speech is cast as purely economically motivated or purely political. 
When, however, a potential conflict between the legal demands of 
these two vital areas of law exists—meaning that speech with both 
characteristics is present—the Supreme Court has resorted to either 
ignoring the complex nature of the speech involved or engaging in an 
overly simplistic bifurcation of political and economic speech. 
A. Boycotts and Naked Price Fixing 
To fully understand when the First Amendment exempts 
possibly anticompetitive conduct from the antitrust laws, one must 
understand not only when no such exemption is found, but also the 
extreme circumstances under which no credible argument could even 
be made. Perhaps the most infamous of those circumstances concerns 
so-called “naked” price fixing, which has earned that moniker due to 
the absence of any redeeming procompetitive features.101 
Assume that purchasers collectively refused to buy a particular 
good unless sellers decreased their prices. Further assume that the 
purchasers at issue were intermediate buyers who used the good in 
question as an input for a final good to be purchased by an end user 
or final consumer. This scenario of an upstream boycott used to 
facilitate price fixing captures the essence of Mandeville Island 
Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co.102 In that case, the Supreme 
Court condemned the conduct as per se illegal.103 The precedential 
significance of the case stemmed from the application of per se 
 
 101.  For a discussion of per se illegality, see supra Part I.B. 
 102.  Mandeville Island Farms v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 222–23 (1948). 
 103.  Id. at 243. 
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condemnation to buyer as well as seller price fixing.104 The Court’s 
analysis was based on an economic analysis of consumer welfare and 
reflected a concern that buyer rigging of the marketplace would 
impact the economic situation of the sellers.105 Most important for the 
purposes of this Article, however, is the complete absence of any 
discussion of speech or the First Amendment in the Mandeville Island 
Farms opinion. Speech among the conspirators was merely the 
mechanism by which price fixing among horizontal competitors, the 
cardinal sin in antitrust, was effectuated. There was no expressive 
component to the communication at issue and, therefore, it was 
implicitly categorized as nonspeech for First Amendment purposes. 
Full enforcement of the antitrust laws did not entail any tradeoff of 
First Amendment values. This rationale, implicit in Mandeville Island 
Farms, received its fullest articulation by the Supreme Court the 
following Term: 
It is true that the [anticompetitive] agreements and course of 
conduct [involving price fixing] here were as in most instances 
brought about through speaking or writing. But it has never been 
deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a 
course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part 
initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either 
spoken, written, or printed. Such an expansive interpretation of the 
constitutional guaranties of speech and press would make it 
practically impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements in 
restraint of trade as well as many other agreements and conspiracies 
deemed injurious to society.106 
Given the necessity of drawing some distinctions regarding speech, 
the question then becomes what characteristics render 
communication subject to First Amendment protection. 
B. Boycotts and Government 
At the opposite end of the boycott spectrum from naked price 
fixing lies the case of Missouri v. National Organization for Women, 
Inc. (NOW).107 Here, full protection of the First Amendment, in the 
form of a Sherman Act exemption, does not come at the expense of 
any self-evident antitrust values. At issue was a convention boycott 
 
 104.  Id. at 235–36. 
 105.  Id. at 240–42. 
 106.  Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949) (citation omitted). 
 107.  Missouri v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. (NOW), 620 F.2d 1301, 1302 (8th Cir. 1980). 
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organized by NOW “against all states [including Missouri] that had 
not ratified the proposed Equal Rights Amendment (ERA).”108 As a 
result, those sectors of the Missouri economy, such as motels and 
restaurants, that catered to convention-based business lost revenue.109 
Missouri’s Attorney General John Ashcroft brought a claim for 
injunctive relief under the antitrust law, which the district court 
denied.110 
The Eighth Circuit cast the issue of first impression111 as whether 
“a politically motivated but economically tooled boycott participated 
in and organized by noncompetitors of those who suffered as a result 
of the boycott” violated the antitrust laws.112 The prominent role of 
motivation (political goal of influencing legislators) and identity 
(noncompetitors of targets) of the boycotters in formulating the issue 
is noteworthy. Many of the “most relevant” facts113 of the case 
pertained to these same considerations: “The ERA is not a ‘financial,’ 
‘economic,’ or ‘commercial’ piece of legislation.”114 “The boycott is 
noncommercial in that its participants are not business interests and 
its purpose is not increased profits.”115 “The boycott is ‘non-economic’ 
as it was not undertaken to advance the economic self-interests of the 
participants.”116 “NOW’s target is the state legislature, the supreme 
policy-making body of the state.”117 
What is particularly telling about this central distinction, 
characterized variously as commercial/noncommercial or 
economic/noneconomic throughout the ruling, is that the court 
acknowledges (albeit in a footnote at the end of the discussion) that 
“we do not rest our decision in this case upon the basis that the 
boycott was noncommercial and noneconomic. Our decision is based 
upon the right to use political activities to petition the government, as 
was the underlying factor in Noerr.”118 
 
 108.  Id. For a discussion of the conspiracy issue, see supra Part I.B. 
 109.  NOW, 620 F.2d at 1302. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  See id. at 1304 (“This court would be remiss if it did not acknowledge at the outset that 
the specific question this case presents has not been decided by the Supreme Court or, for that 
matter, by any other appellate court.”). 
 112.  Id. at 1302. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. at 1311. 
 115.  Id. at 1303. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. at 1315 n.16 (emphasis added); see also supra notes 86–93 and accompanying text. 
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The NOW decision, therefore, turns upon the categorization of 
the boycott as political speech, which, in turn, reflects the context of 
petitioning government. The “economic interest” discussion, although 
legally unnecessary, can be understood as reinforcing the propriety of 
what otherwise would have been a mechanical categorization of 
political speech based on petitioning. The speech is deemed political 
not only because it sought to influence government policy but also 
because the speakers lacked economic self-interest. It is telling that 
the lack of economic self-interest received such prominence given its 
fully acknowledged legal irrelevance. As will become apparent, this 
attention to boycotters’ motivations (economic interests) would 
reappear in future rulings in which, unlike in NOW, they would 
ultimately become outcome determinative. 
C. Boycotts and Economic Interest 
Given the NOW court’s firm reliance on the Noerr doctrine, 
what role would the boycotters’ motives—whether economic or 
noneconomic—play in antitrust cases in the absence of a First 
Amendment immunity based on government petitioning? This 
Section focuses on the Supreme Court’s answer to that question and a 
related variant in two subsequent cases. The rulings reflect an overly 
simplistic categorization of the speech at issue and, as such, they 
represent missed opportunities to explore meaningfully the 
relationship between economically and politically motivated speech 
in a boycott setting. 
1. Economic Interest in Boycott Mechanism.  The first case at 
issue, NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,119 involved a 1966 
NAACP-organized boycott in Claiborne County, Mississippi that 
produced rulings from the Chancery Court of Hinds County as well as 
the Mississippi and United States Supreme Courts.120 
The Claiborne County dispute arose when the NAACP 
“presented white elected officials with a list of particularized 
demands for racial equality and integration. The complainants did not 
receive a satisfactory response and . . . several hundred black persons 
voted to place a boycott on white merchants in the area.”121 Several 
targeted merchants brought suit in state court on grounds of tortious 
 
 119.  NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982). 
 120.  Id. at 889–96. 
 121.  Id. at 889 (footnote omitted). 
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interference with business relations as well as antitrust grounds, 
seeking both to enjoin future boycott activity and recover losses 
occasioned by the boycott.122 The Chancery Court found in favor of 
the merchants on both grounds and awarded $1,250,699 in damages.123 
With regard to liability, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed in 
part, holding that “[t]he United States Supreme Court has seen fit to 
hold [that] boycotts to achieve political ends are not a violation of the 
Sherman Act.”124 The Mississippi Supreme Court, however, affirmed 
the finding of liability as a matter of tort law125 and remanded to the 
lower court for a recalculation of damages.126 The Mississippi 
Supreme Court’s ruling was appealed on nonantitrust grounds to the 
U.S. Supreme Court. Nonetheless, the Court’s ruling and its 
discussion of the First Amendment issues at stake are relevant to, and 
were applied subsequently in, the antitrust context.127 
The Court held that, “[w]hile States have broad power to 
regulate economic activity, we do not find a comparable right to 
prohibit peaceful political activity such as that found in the boycott in 
this case.”128 The Court, reminiscent of the Eighth Circuit’s approach 
in the NOW case, focused on the boycotters’ political motivation, 
which the Court took great pains to characterize as noneconomic. 
The Court reasoned that, “[t]he right of the States to regulate 
economic activity could not justify a complete prohibition against a 
nonviolent, politically motivated boycott designed to force 
governmental and economic change and to effectuate rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution itself.”129 The Court further opined 
that, “[t]here is no suggestion that the NAACP . . . or the individual 
defendants were in competition with the white businesses or that the 
boycott arose from parochial economic interests.”130 To the contrary, 
the Court already had noted that the trial court found an antitrust 
 
 122.  Id. at 889–90. 
 123.  NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 393 So.2d 1290, 1293 (Miss. 1980). 
 124.  Id. at 1301. 
 125.  Id. at 1301–02. 
 126.  Id. at 1307. 
 127.  For a discussion of this issue and an examination of the Supreme Court case FTC v. 
Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990), see infra Part II.C.2.  
 128.  NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982). 
 129.  Id. at 914 (emphasis added). 
 130.  Id. at 915 (emphasis added) (quoting Henry v. First Nat’l Bank of Clarksdale, 595 F.2d 
291, 303 (1979)). The Supreme Court stated that the state trial court found an antitrust violation 
“on the ground that the boycott had diverted black patronage from the white merchants to 
black merchants.” Id. at 893. 
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violation “on the ground that the boycott had diverted black 
patronage from the white merchants to black merchants and to other 
merchants located out of Claiborne County.”131 More specifically, 
[t]he trial court found that some of the boycott leaders were major 
stockholders in a grocery and clothing store called “Our Mart,” 
which as a result of the boycott “became an instant success.” . . . The 
trial court also found that similar boycotted businesses lost sales and 
profits during the period of Our Mart’s increase.132 
An argument made by counsel for the boycotted merchants 
when briefing the issue regarding which individuals were part of the 
alleged conspiracy has relevance here: 
One factor on which the state courts might have relied is that as the 
owner of a grocery store that competed with boycotted stores Mrs. 
Dee had a financial stake in the boycott. A lower level of 
participation in boycott activities may have been required for her 
and for other petitioners . . . who owned competing establishments 
or who owned stock in Our Mart.133 
The presence of economic interest on the part of at least one 
prominent boycott organizer was widely discussed. A New York 
Times Magazine profile of Charles Evers, a central figure in the 
Claiborne County boycott, noted that “‘some of the most bitter 
criticism of Evers has stemmed from his performance as a 
businessman’ and the fact that ‘he opened his stores in unseemly 
proximity to the time when white competitors were being hit by the 
boycotts he had initiated.’”134 Many boycotters in Claiborne County 
“traveled to Fayette (about twenty miles away) after 1967, when 
Evers opened a shopping center there.”135 
 
 131.  Id. at 892. 
 132.  Brief of Respondents at *45, Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (No. 81-202), 1982 WL 
608672 (citing Chancery Court opinion at 25b). Additionally, the boycotters’ petition included 
the following demand: “[a]ll stores must employ Negro clerks and cashiers.” Claiborne 
Hardware, 458 U.S. at 900. 
 133.  Respondents’ Supplemental Brief at *17, Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (No. 
81-202), 1982 WL 608673. 
 134.  EMILYE CROSBY, A LITTLE TASTE OF FREEDOM: THE BLACK FREEDOM STRUGGLE 
IN CLAIBORNE COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI 218 (2005) (quoting Walter Rugaber, “We Can’t Cuss 
White People Anymore. It’s in Our Hands Now,” N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 4, 1968, at SM12); see 
also id. at 134 (“Many shoppers turned to local black businesses, which experienced a major 
boost in sales.”). 
 135.  Id. at 134–35. 
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It is inaccurate to claim, as did the Supreme Court, that no 
economic self-interest was involved.136 To what can one attribute the 
Supreme Court’s characterization regarding the boycotters’ interests? 
As a practical matter, after disclaiming the existence of any economic 
motivation on the part of the boycotters, the Court categorized the 
expressive conduct as political speech by allowing the boycotters the 
strongest First Amendment defense.137 Perhaps the Court feared, and 
properly so, that recognizing any complexity in the boycotters’ 
motivations would diminish their First Amendment protections. In 
fact, Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp have argued with respect to 
Claiborne Hardware that a First Amendment defense “should be 
denied . . . to a black merchant who stands to benefit directly from 
any decline in business to its white competitors.”138 
Perhaps the Court’s statement, quoted previously, is more 
accurately understood as emphasizing that the boycott arose from a 
political objective, notwithstanding any economic self-interest.139 
Based on any reasonable measure, the Claiborne County boycott 
sought to affirm the constitutional rights and basic human dignities of 
its African-American citizens.140 It is telling that even a widely 
celebrated political boycott still implicated economic interest on some 
level. This further weakens the wisdom and basic feasibility of a 
heavy reliance on binary categorization (political or economic 
speech) when expressive boycotts are at issue.141 
 
 136.  See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 137.  Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 915. 
 138.  1B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS 
OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 191–92 (3d ed. 2006); see also Transcript 
of Oral Argument, FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (No. 88-
1198), available at http://www.oyez.com/cases/1980-1989/1989/1989_88_1198/argument (noting 
that, under the rule proposed by the FTC in Superior Court Trial Lawyers and adopted by the 
Court, the Claiborne Hardware boycotters would be condemned as per se illegal given that 
some had “opened a retail store in competition with the white merchants.”). 
 139.  See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 915. 
 140.  See generally CROSBY, supra note 134 (providing a detailed analysis of the civil rights 
objectives). 
 141.  See, e.g., Kay P. Kindred, When First Amendment Values and Competition Policy 
Collide: Resolving the Dilemma of Mixed-Motive Boycotts, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 709, 710–12 (1992) 
(discussing the “elusive distinction” between commercially and economically motivated 
boycotts particularly within the context of “mixed-motive” boycotts). Reliance upon 
categorization more generally has also been subject to criticism. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 426 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he concept of 
‘categories’ fits poorly with the complex reality of expression. Few dividing lines in First 
Amendment law are straight and unwavering, and efforts at categorization inevitably give rise 
only to fuzzy boundaries.”). 
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2. Economic Interest in Boycott Outcomes.  A decade after 
Claiborne Hardware, the Supreme Court revisited that seminal case 
and applied it to a boycott challenged on antitrust grounds. The case, 
FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n,142 constitutes the Court’s 
most recent pronouncement on this particular issue at the interface of 
First Amendment and antitrust law. 
In 1983, “[p]ursuant to a well-publicized plan, a group of lawyers 
[from the Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association (Trial Lawyers)] 
agreed not to represent indigent criminal defendants in the District of 
Columbia Superior Court until the District of Columbia government 
increased the lawyers’ compensation.”143 In the years preceding the 
boycott, various bar associations voiced concerns “about the low fees 
paid to [Criminal Justice Act (CJA)] lawyers.”144 In the year before 
the boycott, various groups, including the boycotters, had “sought to 
persuade the District to increase CJA rates to at least $35 per hour. 
Despite what appeared to be uniform support for the bill, it did not 
pass.”145 In mid-1983, the Mayor of Washington, D.C. met with the 
Trial Lawyers and, despite expressing support for their cause, did not 
increase the rate.146 The Trial Lawyers formed a “strike committee” 
and proceeded to boycott providing legal services.147 The impact on 
the court system was profound, and the D.C. government ultimately 
capitulated and agreed to a schedule for increasing rates to the levels 
sought by the boycotters.148 The lawsuit in question was instituted not 
by the boycott targets, the most likely litigants, but rather by the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which charged the lawyers with 
“conspir[ing] to fix prices and to conduct a boycott.”149 
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Morton Needelman 
conducted a three-week trial and found that the FTC had proven all 
the facts necessary to establish an antitrust violation.150 The ALJ 
 
 142.  FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990). See generally Donald 
I. Baker, The Superior Court Trial Lawyers Case—A Battle on the Frontier Between Politics and 
Antitrust, in ANTITRUST STORIES 257 (Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A. Crane eds., 2007) 
(providing a broad discussion of the case written by counsel for the boycotters). 
 143.  Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 414. 
 144.  Id. at 415. Under the auspices of the Criminal Justice Act, the D.C. government hired 
attorneys to represent indigent criminal defendants. Id. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. at 416. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Id. at 418. 
 149.  In re Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 107 F.T.C. 510, 512 (1986). 
 150.  Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 419 (discussing the trial). 
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rejected the Trial Lawyers’ defenses including the argument that it 
“was a form of political action protected by the First Amendment” 
under Claiborne Hardware.151 Despite his own determinations on the 
facts and the defenses, the ALJ dismissed the complaint given that 
the D.C. government had been “so supportive of the boycotters’ 
demands (or to put it somewhat differently . . . the identity of the 
victim was . . . so elusive).”152 The ALJ concluded by stating, “I see no 
point in striving resolutely for an antitrust triumph in this sensitive 
area when this particular case can be disposed of on a more pragmatic 
basis—there was no harm done.”153 
The ALJ’s “pragmatic moderation found no favor with the 
FTC,” which condemned the conduct as per se illegal.154 On appeal, 
the D.C. Circuit found that the conduct in question constituted “a 
classic restraint of trade” under the Sherman Act.155 The court of 
appeals, however, also found that the “boycott did contain an element 
of expression warranting First Amendment protection.”156 Applying 
the legal standard of United States v. O’Brien, the court held that 
restricting the boycott could not be justified unless it was “no greater 
than is essential” to an important governmental interest.157 In essence, 
per se condemnation was inappropriate and the FTC was required to 
“prove rather than presume that the evil against which the Sherman 
Act is directed looms in the conduct it condemns.”158 As such, the 
court vacated the FTC’s order and remanded for a determination of 
whether respondents possessed “significant market power.”159 
 
 151.  Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 107 F.T.C. at 551–54. 
 152.  Id. at 560. 
 153.  Id. at 561. Commissioner Michael Pertschuk, dissenting from the Commission’s 
decision to institute this action, expressed a similar sentiment: “All this is not to say that 
conspiracies by lawyers or other professionals to raise fees are not antitrust violations, or that I 
would not enthusiastically support a case challenging such a conspiracy in a different set of 
circumstances in the future. In this case at this time, we should spend our time on more harmful 
conduct.” Id. at 513 (Pertschuk, Comm’r, dissenting). 
 154.  Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 419. 
 155.  Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n v. FTC, 856 F.2d 226, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 156.  Id. at 248 (emphasis added). 
 157.  Id. at 249; see also United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (“[A] 
government regulation is sufficiently justified if it . . . furthers an important or substantial 
governmental interest . . . [and] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that 
interest.”). 
 158.  Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 856 F.2d at 250. 
 159.  Id. at 252; see also Paul G. Mahoney, Note, A Market Power Test for Noncommercial 
Boycotts, 93 YALE L.J. 523, 524, 537 (1984) (advocating an “economic effects test” based on 
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The Supreme Court rejected the “creative conclusions of the 
ALJ and the Court of Appeals” and condemned the lawyers in the 
exact same manner as it did the naked price fixers in Mandeville 
Island Farms.160 Both acts were found per se illegal.161 Consistent with 
legal precedent, discussion of the boycotters’ economic and political 
motivations figured prominently in the decision, albeit for different 
reasons. 
The Court characterized the boycott as price fixing among 
horizontal competitors and refused to consider the “social 
justifications proffered for . . . [the] restraint of trade.”162 The 
Sherman Act, observed the Court, “precludes inquiry into the 
question whether competition [and its outcome] is good or bad.”163 As 
such, “[it] is no excuse that the prices fixed are themselves 
reasonable.”164 The Court then considered, and rejected, the Trial 
Lawyers’ defense based on Claiborne Hardware.165 The Court 
declined to find any First Amendment speech based on a decisive 
difference between the boycotters before the Court and those in 
Claiborne Hardware: “No matter how altruistic the motives of 
respondents may have been, it is undisputed that their immediate 
objective was to increase the price that they would be paid for their 
services.”166 By contrast, those in Claiborne Hardware “sought no 
special advantage for themselves.”167 
Upon rejecting the boycotters’ proffered defenses, the Court not 
only applied per se condemnation but also went much further, stating 
that, “O’Brien would offer [the boycotters] no protection even if their 
boycott were uniquely expressive.”168 “A rule that requires courts to 
apply the antitrust laws ‘prudently and with sensitivity’ whenever an 
economic boycott has an ‘expressive component’ would create a 
gaping hole in the fabric of those laws.”169 In sum, any speech interests 
 
market power as striking the appropriate balance between First Amendment and antitrust 
values within the context of noncommercial boycotts). 
 160.  FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 421 (1990). 
 161.  Id. at 429–30. 
 162.  Id. at 424. 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id. (quoting Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 466 U.S. 643, 647 (1980)). 
 165.  Id. at 426 (rejecting the Noerr defense). 
 166.  Id. at 427. 
 167.  Id. at 426. 
 168.  Id. at 430 (emphasis added). 
 169.  Id. at 431–32. 
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inherent in the conduct at issue are trumped not only by the 
government’s substantive interest in antitrust regulation but also by 
the government’s “administrative efficiency interests in antitrust 
regulation.”170 
The Superior Court Trial Lawyers majority’s elevation of the 
Sherman Act over any speech-related concerns constituted a 
significant departure from much First Amendment jurisprudence, 
notwithstanding that the distinction upon which it was based—
political speech as distinct from economically motivated speech—
bore a resemblance to some of the relevant precedent.171 The ruling is 
notable for its categorization of what does and does not constitute 
political speech. The manner in which this distinction is drawn proves 
to be outcome determinative and establishes a clear hierarchy 
wherein protecting competition trumps free speech. 
The rule articulated in Superior Court Trial Lawyers is very 
clear, and this Article argues that this clarity is deceptive and 
unfortunate. Within this antitrust context, First Amendment 
protection appears to extend only so far as an unduly circumscribed 
conception of the “political.” To the extent that the speech at issue 
petitions the government, this factor is of little moment. The presence 
of political speech within the petitioning context reflects the 
ostensible target of the speech. Under Noerr, the First Amendment 
broadly protects government petitioning regardless of the petitioner’s 
economic interest or motivation.172 A protectable interest in political 
speech more generally, however, is reserved for a category of 
expression defined only in the negative as speech in which the 
speaker has no economic interest. As a result of this extremely crude 
method of categorization in cases raising competition policy issues, 
First Amendment concerns other than those addressed by Noerr will 
not complicate strict application of the antitrust laws. The next Part 
explores the numerous and weighty shortcomings of that legal regime. 
III.  EXPRESSIVE BOYCOTTS AS PROTECTED SPEECH 
Part I briefly delineated the basic tenets of the relevant First 
Amendment and antitrust law and precedent. Part II described the 
flawed manner the Court has developed to handle the expressive 
 
 170.  Id. at 430. 
 171.  For a critique of the First Amendment analysis in Superior Court Trial Lawyers, see 
infra Part III.A. 
 172.  E.R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 139 (1961). 
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boycotts at issue. This Part critiques the Supreme Court’s basis for 
disqualifying from First Amendment protection the expressive 
boycotts at issue in this Article. 
A. The Scope of Protected Speech 
Determining what level of protection, if any, expressive boycotts 
merit requires a more expansive consideration of First Amendment 
jurisprudence than those cases which explicitly address the antitrust 
intersection at issue. In fact, a central shortcoming of the majority in 
the Superior Court Trial Lawyers case was its failure to look beyond 
the narrow perspective of this small set of cases, which arguably 
skewed the framing of the legal issue. 
In Superior Court Trial Lawyers, the Supreme Court constrained 
itself not only by focusing solely on political speech but also by 
narrowly defining “political.”173 In effect, the presence of an economic 
self-interest on the part of the boycotters disqualified their expression 
from treatment as political speech.174 This manufactured 
incompatibility and its consequences are generally inconsistent with 
the Court’s own precedent. As this Article has discussed, Noerr 
established that the mere presence, or even dominance, of a self-
interested economic motivation need not diminish one’s First 
Amendment immunity from antitrust liability.175 
The Supreme Court has also recognized that political speech is 
often combined with nonpolitical, oftentimes commercial, speech. In 
such instances, the combined speech receives the level of protection 
accorded to the more strongly protected speech component.176 
It is not clear that a professional’s speech is necessarily commercial 
[and thereby receiving less First Amendment protection] whenever 
 
 173.  Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 427–28. The dissent recognized that 
economic interest was not incompatible with the presence of protected political expression. Id. 
at 449 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Unfortunately, for instant 
purposes, the dissent’s recognition of a protected speech interest was inextricably linked to its 
political nature. “Expressive boycotts have been a principal means of political communication 
since the birth of the Republic.” Id. at 447. 
 174.  For a discussion on the role of economic self-interest in boycotts, see supra Part II.C. 
 175.  Noerr, 365 U.S. at 139; see also Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 
U.S. 492, 499 (1988) (“Concerted efforts to restrain or monopolize trade by petitioning 
government officials are protected from antitrust liability under the doctrine established by 
Noerr.”). 
 176.  See Kindred, supra note 141, at 738 (arguing that when the Supreme Court has 
assessed speech that is both commercial and noncommercial, it has “consistently treated the 
speech as political”). 
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it relates to that person’s financial motivation for speaking. But even 
assuming, without deciding, that such speech in the abstract is 
indeed merely “commercial,” we do not believe that the speech 
retains its commercial character when it is inextricably intertwined 
with otherwise fully protected speech.177 
This ruling in Riley, addressing speech within the context of 
charitable solicitations, recognized that care “must be undertaken 
with due regard for the reality that [such speech] is characteristically 
intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech . . . and 
for the reality that without solicitation the flow of such information 
and advocacy would likely cease.”178 
Although instructive, charitable solicitations are not analogous 
to the expressive boycotts at issue for a multitude of reasons; most 
importantly, the boycotts at issue in this Article often entail activities 
that are potentially illegal (under either a per se or rule of reason 
analysis). The presence of a nominally per se violation poses the 
greater challenge for First Amendment law. As this Article discusses, 
within a conventional antitrust setting, the imposition of per se 
illegality to price fixing reflects the reasonable assumptions that the 
conduct may have pernicious effects and, equally important, that it 
will not have any salutary effects.179 It is important to recognize that, 
in a large category of cases, such as when the price fixers do not have 
market power, no pernicious effect will actually occur. The presence 
of automatic condemnation is not questioned, however, because no 
beneficial effects are unnecessarily sacrificed. This extremely limited 
inquiry also serves administrative efficiency. The propriety of this 
presumed tradeoff becomes uncertain, however, when society 
attaches value to the expressive function of the anticompetitive 
conduct at issue. 
B. Boycott as a Unique Form of Speech 
This Section considers the value—perhaps even unique value—
of expressive boycotts. Expressive boycotts, in contrast to narrowly 
instrumental boycotts such as that in Mandeville Island, constitute a 
form of public discourse. The undertakings are public, involve issues 
of social policy (in addition to possible economic gain) that transcend 
 
 177.  Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 795–96 (1988) (citations 
omitted); see also supra note 33. 
 178.  Riley, 487 U.S. at 796. 
 179.  For a discussion of per se illegality, see supra Part I.B. 
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the specific transactions at issue, and take the form of normative 
debate.180 This Section explains how expressive boycotts combine two 
key elements that make them effective speech: expression through 
sacrifice and expression as a group. 
1. Sacrifice.  Marshall McLuhan’s observation that “the medium 
is the message”181 takes on a particular relevance within the context of 
boycotts. By their very nature, boycotts often poignantly convey the 
notion of sacrifice and, as a consequence, signal an intensity of 
commitment. “A boycott, like a hunger strike, conveys an emotional 
message that is absent in a letter to the editor, a conversation with the 
mayor, or even a protest march.”182 Moreover, when sacrifice is 
involved, the ongoing nature of the boycott further underscores the 
element of commitment. As one participant in the Claiborne boycott 
observed, “Unlike voter registration, which was a one-time act, the 
boycott relied on a daily commitment, making it fundamental to the 
lives of most blacks.”183 It entailed a range of sacrifices including 
“doing without spontaneous purchases (like ice cream on a hot day), 
and the more fundamental problems of finding transportation and 
securing credit.”184 
Justices William J. Brennan, Jr. and Thurgood Marshall urged a 
similar assessment in their Superior Court Trial Lawyers dissent: “The 
refusal of the Trial Lawyers to accept appointments by itself 
communicated a powerful idea: CJA compensation rates had 
deteriorated so much, relatively speaking, that the lawyers were 
willing to forgo their livelihoods rather than return to work.”185 “By 
 
 180.  See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary 
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1802–03 (2004) (identifying 
factors that render the application of the First Amendment more likely). 
 181.  See generally MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF 
MAN 23–35 (1964) (discussing the relationship between medium and message). 
 182.  FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 450 (1990) (Brennan J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 183.  CROSBY, supra note 134, at 130. 
 184.  Id. at 135. “[M]ost blacks began to do the bulk of their shopping in Vicksburg (about 
thirty miles away) and Jackson (about sixty miles away).” Id. at 134. For a related discussion on 
additional shopping in Fayette, see supra notes 134–35 and accompanying text. 
 185.  Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 450 (Brennan, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred in part and 
dissented in part from the Court’s ruling. They concurred with the majority that the boycotters’ 
conduct was “neither clearly outside the scope of the Sherman Act nor automatically 
immunized . . . by the First Amendment.” Id. at 437. The Justices dissented with regard to the 
majority’s condemnation of the boycott under a per se rule. Id. Owing to this Article’s focus on 
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sacrificing income that they actually desired, and thus inflicting 
hardship on themselves as well as on the city, the lawyers 
demonstrated the intensity of their feelings and the depth of their 
commitment.”186 
What is most significant about the expressive boycotts at issue in 
this Article is the interplay of sacrifice and self-interest. Typically, 
boycotters’ sacrifice involves the intentional disruption of their 
natural patterns of buying and selling.187 When economic self-interest 
is implicated, it is usually reflected in the boycott’s objective. The 
boycotters incur the losses attendant to the undertaking even though 
the prospect of prevailing and, thereby, benefiting is highly uncertain. 
Moreover, nonparticipating competitors of the boycotters may not 
only acquire certain advantages over the boycotters during the 
protest, but the nonparticipants also typically share in the benefits 
should the protest be successful. Just as economic self-interest, within 
other contexts, has not been deemed inconsistent with protected 
speech, so, too, it is not inconsistent with sacrifice. 
2. Solidarity.  While in theory expressive action, such as a 
nonpurchase, can be undertaken by a single individual, within the 
context of boycotts it is invariably a joint effort. Both the high level of 
First Amendment protection accorded to joint speech and its 
underlying rationale have clear implications for joint expressive 
conduct. “The Court has acknowledged the importance of freedom of 
association in guaranteeing the right of people to make their voices 
heard on public issues: ‘Effective advocacy of both public and private 
points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably 
enhanced by group association . . . .’”188 The basis for extending First 
Amendment protections in this manner is clear: “The right to speak is 
often exercised most effectively by combining one’s voice with the 
 
the second of these two points, it refers to Brennan and Marshall’s opinion as a dissent. Justice 
Blackmun agreed with Justice Brennan’s reasoning but wrote a separate statement concurring 
in part and dissenting in part from the Court’s opinion. Id. at 453 (Blackmun, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). This Article uses “the dissent” to refer to Justice Brennan’s 
statement. 
 186.  Id. at 450 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 187.  As discussed supra Part II.C.2, instances may arise in which one or more boycotters 
may directly benefit while the effort was ongoing. 
 188.  Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981) (quoting 
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)). 
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voice of others.”189 Perhaps most significant about this right of 
“expressive association” is its unequivocal basis in protecting 
“effective” speech rather than in legitimate but abstract notions of 
personal autonomy.190 Joint advocacy contributes to speech in that 
individuals may be more willing to undertake expressive actions, such 
as boycotts, as part of a group for reasons unrelated to the group’s 
coercive economic effect. Individuals oftentimes are induced to 
participate because of “the value of the collective goal of the 
movement, social prestige, feelings of solidarity, normative 
expectations, or the value of the specific identity invoked by the 
movement.”191 In fact, the perceived value of the boycott goal, and in 
turn the cost potential supporters may be willing to incur, may 
increase when the goal is shared collectively by the community from 
which a prospective boycotter hails. 
An individual’s self-concept derives in part from the groups to which 
she belongs, and a key part of group identity may be participation in 
group causes. Individuals may . . . perceive a higher gain from 
punishing the firm when others are also doing so (perhaps because 
they infer something about the seriousness of the firm’s behavior 
from the choices of others). 192 
These noneconomic values associated with participation in a group 
effort are reflected in the recollections of an activist “who began 
working in Claiborne County in the 1970s [and] remembered that the 
boycott ‘was a part of people’s identity, what they had or hadn’t done 
during that boycott. I remember that very clearly. It was an 
identifier.’”193 
 
 189.  Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 68 (2006); see 
also Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984) (“[T]he Court has recognized a right to 
associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment—
speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion. The 
Constitution guarantees freedom of association of this kind as an indispensable means of 
preserving other individual liberties.”). 
 190.  Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 68. 
 191.  Aradhana Roy, The Mobilization and Performance Consequences of Firms’ 
Participation in Social Movements: Firms in the Open Source Movement 78 (2008) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) 
(citations omitted). 
 192.  Andrew John & Jill Klein, The Boycott Puzzle: Consumer Motivations for Purchase 
Sacrifice, 49 MGMT. SCI. 1196, 1204 (2003). 
 193.  CROSBY, supra note 134, at 130. 
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3. Mechanism Selection.  Boycotts are unique expressive 
undertakings combining elements of sacrifice and solidarity. These 
two characteristics typically lend credibility to the undertaking. One 
must be sensitive to not only the message a boycott sends but also the 
message a nonboycott transmits. 
A useful starting point for the issue of mechanism selection is the 
sundry ways the Court addressed the issue in Superior Court Trial 
Lawyers. As part and parcel of the majority’s rejection of the First 
Amendment’s applicability to the lawyers’ boycott, the Court 
observed that the Trial Lawyers’ efforts to explain their cause and “to 
lobby District officials to enact favorable legislation . . . were activities 
that were fully protected by the First Amendment. But nothing in the 
FTC’s order would curtail such activities, and nothing in the FTC’s 
reasoning condemned any of those activities.”194 What relevance, if 
any, should attach to the existence of alternative mechanisms? Should 
it matter that the other means available are arguably less effective at 
conveying the message, perhaps due to their relative inability to 
attract press coverage, than are the contested means? All other things 
being equal, a comparable message conveyed without these 
characteristics—sacrifice and solidarity—will also attract less media 
attention. These insights likely informed Dean Wiley Branton’s 
recommendation to the Trial Lawyers that they do “something 
dramatic to attract attention.”195 
It is undeniable that several constitutionally protected avenues 
technically exist for the boycotters to publicize their underlying 
grievance. The manner in which the Superior Court Trial Lawyers 
ruling discussed the existence of those protected outlets, however, 
seems somewhat reminiscent of a position that the Court had already 
emphatically rejected, namely that a given “burden [on speech] is 
permissible because other avenues of expression remain open.”196 The 
rationale is that merely because the speakers “remain free to employ 
other means to disseminate their ideas does not take their [contested] 
speech . . . outside the bounds of First Amendment protection.”197 As 
the Court stated previously, the First Amendment protects one’s right 
not only “to advocate [one’s] cause but also to select what [one] 
 
 194.  FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 426 (1990). 
 195.  Id. at 451 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 196.  Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 424 (1988). 
 197.  Id. 
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believe[s] to be the most effective means for so doing.”198 This last 
point takes on particular practical salience when the contested 
“avenues of communication” are more effective, fundamental, or 
economical than those uncontested.199 Although the majority in 
Superior Court Trial Lawyers treated, whether intentionally or not, 
the different avenues for speech as somewhat fungible, the dissent 
argued, to the contrary, that it was legally relevant that “the Trial 
Lawyers enjoyed no other effective means of making themselves 
heard.”200 
This Article argues that expressive boycotts are unique 
expressive speech worthy of protection under First Amendment law. 
To see this, compare a protest made through a joint petition against 
use restrictions on licenses with a joint boycott of the same. Although 
a joint petition could attract some public attention, it lacks important 
features that undermine the strength of its message relative to a 
group boycott. Signing a joint statement is a one-time event, whereas 
a boycott is ongoing and hence more powerful. Of course, some types 
of nonboycott speech could also be ongoing. The more important 
difference is that boycotts involve ongoing sacrifice whereas joint 
petitions involve little, if any, sacrifice. Thus, a joint petition makes a 
weaker and less credible statement. 
Attracting the press is often an extremely effective, and always a 
legitimate, mechanism for engaging in social discourse. Consider, for 
example, that media attention often enables boycotters to “broaden 
the scope of conflict.”201 The sympathy of third parties can increase 
the power of the boycotters relative to their target even if those third 
parties do not participate in the relevant market and, therefore, 
cannot contribute directly to the underlying economic impact of the 
boycott itself.202 The mere fact of media coverage can serve to 
“validate[]” the importance of the boycott not only to third parties 
but also to its participants.203 In the most extreme cases, “[r]eceiving 
standing in the media is often a necessary condition before targets of 
influence will grant a [boycott] recognition and deal with its claims 
 
 198.  Id. 
 199.  Id. 
 200.  Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 437 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added). 
 201.  William A. Gamson & Gadi Wolfsfeld, Movements and Media as Interacting Systems, 
528 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 114, 116 (1993). 
 202.  See id. 
 203.  Id. 
GREENE IN FINAL 2/10/2010  9:09:32 PM 
2010] ANTITRUST CENSORSHIP 1075 
and demands.”204 Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that some 
participants may not be willing to accept the ongoing cost of the 
boycott, in terms of sacrifice, without an external signal that their 
message is being heard on some level.205 Of course, just as media 
coverage can foment public discourse, it can also facilitate attracting 
the critical mass of boycotters necessary to wield market power. 
Finally, despite general recognition of the significance of sacrifice 
within a boycott context, the equally important significance of a 
nonboycott by protestors has gone unrecognized. Under many 
circumstances, when protestors continue business as usual with the 
target of their criticism, they may blunt (if not entirely undermine) 
the force of their objections or at least how they are perceived. One’s 
ability to forgo purchasing entirely reflects in part whether substitutes 
are available and the extent to which the good is a necessity versus a 
luxury. Boycotts are particularly important when permanently exiting 
the market is not a viable option. This circumstance will most likely 
arise when there are no strong substitutes or when the controversy 
that prompted individuals to forgo purchases would continue to 
matter to them even if they were not making purchases.206 
IV.  EXPRESSIVE BOYCOTTS INVOLVING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
Part III highlights the role of expressive boycotts in society’s 
ongoing and varied civil rights discourse. This Part introduces a very 
different series of contemporary boycotts characterized by the 
centrality of social debate regarding intellectual property. It is quite 
possible that such undertakings will become even more prevalent in 
the future and, therefore, will continue to raise the issues that this 
Article seeks to address. The discourse generated by the boycotts 
introduced in this Part transcends the transactions nominally involved 
and reflects a desire to engage in public discussion on broader issues 
including the relationship between patents and scientific progress, 
humanitarian limits on for-profit pricing of medicines, and the 
relationship between intellectual property (both patents and 
copyrights) and information sharing in academic environments.207 
 
 204.  Id. 
 205.  For a description of the effects that media coverage can have on increasing 
participation by signaling the likelihood of success, see Roy, supra note 191, at 80. 
 206.  HIRSCHMAN, supra note 14, at 100. 
 207.  For ease of exposition, this Article characterizes the anecdotes as boycotts rather than 
as alleged or possible boycotts. The available information does not permit establishing 
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Dissatisfaction over pricing issues typically animates these 
boycotts. As discussed previously, antitrust generally adopts a zero-
tolerance policy of per se illegality when manipulation of market 
pricing is involved.208 This same general policy applies to efforts to 
influence intellectual property pricing. The price levels, condemned 
by the boycotters as exorbitant, may reflect the intellectual property 
owner’s market power emanating from, for example, a merger among 
intellectual property owners or a patent. The ultimate value and 
subsequent pricing of that patent, or of goods that embody or 
otherwise depend upon the patent, reflect market forces. More 
specifically, the pricing will reflect the extent to which, if at all, the 
patent right conveys market power, which, in turn, depends upon the 
presence or absence of reasonable substitutes.209 Antitrust permits 
even supracompetitive pricing if it results from lawfully acquired 
market power.210 Market power stemming from the exclusive use 
rights granted to an inventor via a patent is also accepted as lawful. 
This exclusivity is viewed as creating innovation incentives. 
A. Oncomouse 
The “mouse genetics community” is a “tight-knit group of 
researchers who use[] mouse models to study illness.”211 DuPont held 
an exclusive license for the patent covering the Oncomouse, a 
genetically engineered mouse that quickly became extremely valuable 
to this community. DuPont’s licensing terms can be divided into three 
general categories: the price of the mice themselves, the restrictions 
on sharing among researchers, and the control that DuPont exerted 
over downstream inventions. DuPont, who is not alone in such 
licensing practices, imposed what were widely viewed by the mouse 
 
definitively that all four examples involved boycotts, though, even for those protests for which 
the least information is available, a good case can be made that a boycott was undertaken. 
 208.  See supra notes 60–68 and accompanying text. 
 209.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 2.2 (1995), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ 
0558.pdf. 
 210.  Market power may be lawfully acquired and maintained through, for example, 
“growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic 
accident.” United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966). In such instances, “[t]he 
successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins.” 
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 211.  Fiona Murray, The Oncomouse that Roared: Resistance & Accommodation to Patenting 
in Academic Science, 115 AM. J. SOC. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 1), available at 
http://fmurray.scripts.mit.edu/docs/THE_ONCOMOUSE_THAT_ROARED_FINAL.pdf. 
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genetics community as excessively onerous and restrictive conditions 
for access to this vital technology.212  
DuPont’s mouse-breeding arm, GenPharm, announced prices of 
“$80–150 per [Onco]mouse—as much as 10 times the price charged 
by nonprofit mouse breeders such as the Jackson Laboratories.”213 In 
addition, GenPharm required researchers to purchase each mouse 
although researchers traditionally breed additional mice without 
further charges.214 “That can quickly amount to thousands of dollars 
per lab—a lot of money for a resource that researchers are used to 
getting for free.”215 
In addition to the cost of the mice, DuPont imposed additional 
restrictions on scientists using Oncomice: scientists were no longer 
able to “follow their traditional practices of sharing mice,” DuPont 
exercised a form of “[c]ontractual control of scientific disclosure” 
including “annual disclosure requirements,” and DuPont required 
assignment of “[r]each through rights on future discoveries made with 
an Oncomouse.”216 Regarding the restrictions placed upon the sharing 
of mice, one scientist observed, “[i]t was an enormous obstacle to free 
and open distribution of information and materials . . . . [I]t was a 
whole new way of doing science . . . [and] it really affected the way 
the mouse research community works.”217 
“The grumbling reached insurrection proportions after a meeting 
at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory . . . when some 300 researchers 
stayed for an unscheduled afternoon session on GenPharm’s pricing 
 
 212.  Id. Neither DuPont’s licensing restrictions nor the subsequent reaction of the scientist 
consumers were unique to either the Oncomouse research tool or DuPont more generally. 
Another example of restrictions on the use of research tools resisted by the research community 
is Invitrogen’s “Gateway” technology, which allows researchers to “build ORF, promoter, and 
other clone sets for archiving and future access.” Invitrogen, Gateway Open Architecture 
Policy, http://www.invitrogen.com/site/us/en/home/Products-and-Services/Applications/Cloning/ 
Gateway-Cloning/GatewayC-Misc/Additional-Info-Inquiries.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2010). In 
2003, four years after the initial launch of its Gateway technology, Invitrogen changed its use 
restriction policy to an open access policy, noting that “our policies were too restrictive, and 
instead of enabling your research with advanced technology, we were impeding it with our 
interest in protecting intellectual property.” Id. 
 213.  Christopher Anderson, Researchers Win Decision on Knockout Mouse Pricing, 260 
SCIENCE 23, 23 (1993). 
 214.  Id. 
 215.  Id. 
 216.  Murray, supra note 211 (manuscript at 25). 
 217.  Id. (manuscript at 26) (quoting Sam Jaffe, Ongoing Battle over Transgenic Mice, 
SCIENTIST, July 19, 2004, at 46, 46). 
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policy . . . .”218 Many of the scientists were troubled not only by the 
transaction costs but also by the “normative costs” associated with 
DuPont’s licensing terms.219 “Scientists resorted to civil disobedience. 
They chose to flaunt the law ‘and simply breed their own Oncomice, 
effectively boycotting the company.’”220 Some faculty openly resisted 
DuPont’s restrictions, continuing their research without adhering to 
them, whereas other researchers, rather than complying with 
DuPont’s demands or “liv[ing] with a cloud of fear,” turned to 
different projects not requiring the use of Oncomice.221 
Assuming arguendo the existence of an Oncomouse boycott, 
certain features of this matter warrant particular attention. 
Conventional boycotts threaten that the participants will not purchase 
the target’s product unless it modifies some or all of the conditions at 
issue. The Oncomouse boycott is unconventional to the extent that 
the boycotters, because of their infringement, were not deprived of 
the “boycotted” product. Instead, their “sacrifice” appears to be their 
exposure to potential infringement lawsuits. Presumably, the 
boycotters would be willing to buy from DuPont rather than infringe 
if DuPont were to alter its purchase conditions. In addition, it seems 
likely that the facts would support the boycott as bona fide speech, 
given the relatively public nature of the boycott and the objections of 
the conspirators to licensing conditions contrary to the mouse 
community’s norms for breeding mice and sharing information. 
This Oncomouse case was at least partially resolved through 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) intervention. Disagreement 
regarding the interpretation of the NIH-brokered deal, however, led 
to renewed tension between DuPont and a number of universities. 222 
Absent the deal, DuPont could have brought Oncomouse lawsuits 
 
 218.  Anderson, supra note 213, at 23. 
 219.  Murray, supra note 211 (manuscript at 27). 
 220.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 221.  Id. (manuscript at 29). 
 222.  Over time, as university researchers have become more involved with for-profit 
entities and as universities have begun to exploit their patents as revenue sources, the 
distinctions between university research and for-profit research have lessened. Id. (manuscript 
at 1–2). As was observed within the context of a scientist boycott (regarding licensing terms) of 
a different DuPont research tool: “DuPont is not the lone black hat on this issue. Universities, 
themselves, are also asking for reach-through provisions for technology they’re exporting to 
other institutions and companies, and those provisions are not unlike the demands DuPont is 
making for Cre-lox.” Naomi Freundlich, Cre-lox Controversy Divides Institutions, Prompts NIH 
Panel, SIGNALS, June 12, 1998, http://signalsmag.com/signalsmag.nsf/657b06742b5748e88825657 
0005cba01/a91504e7700ed9b0882566210046c958?OpenDocument. 
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claiming infringement and, perhaps, an illegal boycott. This Article 
seeks to ensure that First Amendment values are respected when 
legal action in response to expressive boycotts takes the form of an 
antitrust suit.223 
It is noteworthy that DuPont has pursued increasingly 
“aggressive licensing demands on academic and research institutions” 
regarding the Oncomouse.224 In 2003, almost the entire University of 
California system rejected a license with DuPont regarding 
“genetically engineered mice,” owing to the university system’s 
dissatisfaction with DuPont’s restrictive licensing terms.225 “The state 
university’s Davis campus did, however, agree to the company’s 
licensing requirements after one of its researchers bred genetically 
engineered mice without DuPont permission and received a warning 
letter . . . .”226 Academics and universities, to the extent that they 
considered themselves somewhat removed from the threat of legal 
action, are quickly being disabused of any notion that for-profit 
entities like DuPont will not pursue them legally. 
B. Cre-lox 
DuPont also controls access to the research tool Cre-lox, which 
allows researchers to “knock out” a specific gene in the DNA of a 
mouse, thereby enhancing researchers’ ability to determine “gene 
function—the holy grail of genomics.”227 Despite having no 
commercial value, Cre-lox has the potential to unlock a stream of 
 
 223.  It is also important, particularly in the absence of the proposed changes in the law, to 
educate potential boycotters regarding their exposure under the antitrust laws. For example, an 
economist opining on the agbiotech industry has advocated a “joint boycott of research 
agreements [by the ‘public research sector’] with any firm with which there had been prior 
efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and 
conditions, and the efforts had been unsuccessful within a reasonable period of time” with 
“significant coordination and organization” because “[m]oral suasion . . . is unlikely to be 
sufficient in itself.” William Lesser, “Holding Up” the Public Agbiotech Research Sector over 
Component Technologies, in TRANSITIONS IN AGBIOTECH: ECONOMICS OF STRATEGY AND 
POLICY 601, 613–14 (William Lesser ed., 2000), available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/ 
bitstream/26024/1/n1659932.pdf. 
 224.  See Sasha Blaug et al., Managing Innovation: University-Industry Partnerships and the 
Licensing of the Harvard Mouse, 22 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 761, 761 (2004). 
 225.  Brian Dakss, Is Commerce Blocking Science?, CBS NEWS, Nov. 1, 2003, http://www. 
cbsnews.com/stories/2003/11/01/tech/main581313.shtml. 
 226.  Id. (quoting Larry Fox, Chief Patent Counsel, University of California, Davis). 
 227.  Freundlich, supra note 222. 
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commercially valuable innovations.228 In the mid-1990s, DuPont 
imposed stringent restrictions on the users of Cre-lox mice including 
limitations on the use and sharing of Cre-lox materials. DuPont also 
demanded rights over innovations developed using the Cre-lox tool.229 
As with the Oncomouse, the scientific community expressed concerns 
that DuPont’s “restrictive terms could ‘seriously impede further basic 
research and thwart development of future technologies that will 
benefit the public.’”230 
Although dozens of universities signed agreements with DuPont, 
the University of California and several other institutions refused to 
do so.231 This ostensibly uneven refusal to deal caused “resentment 
among universities: One university licensing officer who asked to 
remain anonymous says the universities who’ve refused to sign the 
Cre-lox license are furious at the signatories for ‘breaking ranks’ over 
this issue.”232 Ultimately, the Cre-lox protest was resolved after 
Harold Varmus, a leading researcher in this community who had 
since become Director of NIH, brokered a compromise with 
DuPont.233 Varmus played a similar role in mediating the Oncomouse 
dispute.234 
Assuming arguendo the existence of boycotts, the Cre-lox 
dispute differs along a significant dimension from the Oncomouse 
dispute. The Cre-lox boycotters were concerned solely about use 
restrictions, whereas the Oncomouse boycotters protested both 
pricing and nonpricing issues. This distinction is critical to antitrust 
analysis because boycotts directed toward pricing are reviewed under 
a per se standard, whereas nonprice boycotts are reviewed under the 
more lenient rule of reason standard which requires a negative 
competitive effect to establish antitrust liability. The traditional 
significance of this distinction would be somewhat muted within this 
 
 228.  See id. (“Cre-lox will likely be no more an element of any eventual products or 
businesses that emerge from the elucidation of those functions than a hammer is a part of the 
eventual table it helps build.”). 
 229.  DuPont and NIH Reach Agreement over Genetic Mice, PROF. ETHICS REP., Summer 
1998, at 3, available at http://www.aaas.org/spp/sfrl/per/per14.htm. 
 230.  Marshall, supra note 12, at 257 (quoting a letter from NIH Director Varmus to DuPont 
regarding his refusal to sign an agreement regarding the Cre-lox mouse). 
 231.  Meredith Wadman, DuPont Opens Up Access to Genetics Tool, 394 NATURE 819, 819 
(1998). 
 232.  Id. 
 233.  Marshall, supra note 12, at 257. 
 234.  Id. 
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context, however, if a target’s capitulations to boycotters’ demands 
constituted evidence of competitive effect.235 
C. Academic Periodicals 
In recent years, many professors and librarians have grown 
increasingly dissatisfied with the escalating price of academic journals 
and its adverse effect on scholarly exchange. One pivotal moment in 
this ongoing debate occurred when Professors Peter Walter and Keith 
Yamamoto published an open letter advocating a boycott.236 
Cell Press is breaking an unwritten contract with the scientific 
community: being a publisher of our research carries the 
responsibility to make our contributions publicly available at 
reasonable rates. As an academic community, it is time that we 
reassert our values. We can all think of better ways to spend our 
time than providing free services to support a publisher that values 
profit above its academic mission. . . . Our goal is to effect change, 
but to be effective we must stand together.237 
To “effect change,” Walter and Yamamoto advocated that scholars 
boycott providing important services to Cell Press (reviewing 
manuscripts, serving on editorial boards, or submitting papers) and 
that they widely communicate the “pricing tactics and business 
strategies” of Cell Press’s publisher, Elsevier.238 This should continue, 
according to Walter and Yamamoto, until “the University of 
California [the two authors’ academic institution] and other 
institutions are granted electronic access to Cell Press journals.”239 
In many regards, this letter echoed a prior and less targeted call 
to boycott made by a Public Library of Science (PLoS) initiative 
urging researchers to boycott publication in all scientific journals that 
did not “grant unrestricted free distribution rights to 
[research] . . . within 6 months of their initial publication date.”240 
PLoS’s petition attracted a large number of signatories, though, 
 
 235.  For distinguishing concessions based on coercion versus persuasion, see infra Part 
V.A.3. 
 236.  See generally Jeanne Lenzer, Scientists Call for a Boycott of Cell Press, 327 BRI. MED. 
J. 1070 (2003), available at http://bmj.com/cgi/content/full/327/7423/1070-b (“The boycott, says 
Professor Walter, is ‘resonating incredibly well.’”). 
 237.  Open Letter, supra note 10. 
 238.  Id. 
 239.  Id. 
 240.  Open Letter from Pub. Library of Sci. to scientific publishers (undated), available at 
http://www.plos.org/about/letter.html. 
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ultimately, PLoS’s primary impact came through its activity as a 
nonprofit scientific and medical online publishing venture.241 The 
intertwining of efforts to boycott a for-profit publication and to 
support comparable publications offered through learned societies or 
universities at substantially lower prices has arisen in other forms.242 
The following example involving the Journal of Algorithms illustrates 
one particular trend: 
For several years we and many of our colleagues have become more 
and more concerned about the fact that libraries are increasingly 
unable to afford the prices being charged by commercial publishers 
of scientific journals. . . . [In the face of such concerns,] the entire 
editorial board ultimately decided to resign from the Journal of 
Algorithms in favor of launching a new journal to be called ACM 
Transactions on Algorithms . . . .243 
University librarians are another group of key participants in the 
phenomenon of boycotting academic publishers. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, law school librarians have most openly acknowledged 
the antitrust implications of these boycotts. The American 
Association of Law Libraries’ (AALL) website includes “How does 
antitrust affect AALL’s activities?” among its listing of frequently 
 
 241.  Assessing these undertakings raises interesting issues regarding proof of conspiracy. 
Although it is true that the petitions associated with the PLoS boycott attracted thousands of 
faculty members as signatories, are they coconspirators for antitrust purposes? In the absence of 
an actual agreement (which one could argue the petition represents), key characteristics for 
discerning the existence of an antitrust conspiracy include whether mechanisms exist for the 
monitoring of compliance with the alleged agreement and for the disciplining of those who 
violate the agreement. By its very nature, compliance by signatories to a petition announcing 
the rejection of certain publishing outlets is readily monitored. One of the more interesting 
circumstances arising from the PLoS petition involved an article in The Physiologist specifically 
identifying a high-profile petition signatory, Dr. Patrick Brown, who, according to the article’s 
author, had published in a journal being boycotted. Margaret Reich, Peace, Love, and PLoS, 46 
PHYSIOLOGIST 137 (2003), available at http://the-aps.org/news/PLoS.pdf. The Physiologist 
subsequently published a retraction and apology after it discovered that Brown’s article had 
been published while the petition was circulating “but prior to the implementation date for 
action.” Clarification, 46 PHYSIOLOGIST 262, 262 (2003), available at http://www.the-aps.org/ 
publications/tphys/images/tphys10x03.pdf. 
 242.  See generally Letter from Donald Knuth, Co-Editor, Journal of Algorithms, to 
Editorial Bd., Journal of Algorithms (Oct. 25, 2003), available at http://www-cs-faculty.stanford. 
edu/~knuth/joalet.pdf (delineating options other than publication through for-profit publishers). 
 243.  Memorandum from Donald E. Knuth, David S. Johnson & Zvi Galil, former Co-
Editors, Journal of Algorithms, on changes at the Journal of Algorithms (undated), available at 
http://www.cs.colorado.edu/~hal/s.pdf. 
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asked questions.244 AALL notes that “[s]ome decisions, which may 
have had the appearance of being based on concern about vendor 
reaction, have in fact been made on the basis of advice from AALL’s 
legal counsel.”245 AALL cites legal concerns about “primarily the 
Sherman Antitrust Act, which prohibits collective action in restraint of 
trade” and concurrently acknowledges that “this concern for antitrust 
may seem ironic and frustrating in the face of the shrinking 
competition among legal information vendors [owing to mergers].”246 
Nonetheless, the AALL concludes that “[its] leadership feels that 
simply ignoring AALL legal counsel’s advice would be irresponsible 
and would violate their fiduciary duties to the AALL membership.”247 
In an e-mail to the AALL membership, AALL President Ann 
Fessenden delineated the organization’s antitrust policy248 and noted 
that “legal counsel has expressed considerable concern 
about . . . boycotting, refusing to sign contracts etc.”249 More 
specifically, Fessenden stated that, “[t]wo decisions which have been 
based on this [legal] advice included cancellation of an SCCLL-SIS 
program on legal publishing (program description included ‘boycotts’ 
as a possible member response to price increases) and some changes 
that were made in [another program].”250 
 
 244.  Am. Ass’n of Law Libraries, Vendor Relations FAQ, http://www.aallnet.org/vendor 
relations/faq.asp (last visited Jan. 31, 2010). 
 245.  Id. 
 246.  Id.; see also Mary M. Case, Information Access Alliance: Challenging Anticompetitive 
Behavior in Academic Publishing, COLLEGE & RES. LIBRARIES NEWS, June 2004, 
http://www.ala.org/ala/mgrps/divs/acrl/publications/crlnews/2004/jun/iaa.cfm (delineating the 
“general global trend” of mergers within scholarly publishing). 
 247.  Am. Ass’n of Law Libraries, supra note 244. 
 248.  The policy, posted online, reads in part: “AALL cannot sanction programming, 
publications, or other communications that may provide the basis for an inference that members 
agreed to take any action relating to prices, services, production, allocation of markets, boycotts, 
refusals to deal, or any other matter having a market effect. AALL is responsible for statements 
made by speakers at our programs and in articles in our publications.” Id. 
 249.  Posting of Ann Fessenden, AALL President, ann_fessenden@ca8.uscourts.gov, to 
lawlibdir@lists.washlaw.edu (Nov. 5, 2007) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 250.  Id. Kendall F. Svengalis, the speaker whose presentation was cancelled, has written 
that in conversation with lawyers from the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division [DOJ] he 
learned that DOJ “would only get involved if some sort of concerted organizational action, such 
as a boycott, was being organized.” DOJ’s attorney specifically referenced the “travel agent 
boycott of airlines, etc. back in the 1980s.” Posting of Kendall F. Svengalis, President, Rhode 
Island Law Press and Adjunct Professor, University of Rhode Island, to Owner-Law-
Lib@ucdavis.edu (Aug. 27, 2007), available at http://listproc.ucdavis.edu/archives/law-lib/law-lib. 
log0708/0267.html. Throughout the 1980s a number of antitrust proceedings were undertaken 
involving the travel industry generally and travel agents in particular. The DOJ attorney 
appears to have referenced the slightly later proceeding (early 1990s) of United States v. 
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Concern that discussions about publisher policies including 
pricing may raise antitrust issues emanates not only from the 
leadership of organizations such as the AALL but also from 
individual participants on relevant listservs. Peter Banks, Acting Vice 
President for Publications at the nonprofit American Diabetes 
Organization, wrote: “I am not trying to inhibit discussion by 
librarians, publishers, or dog catchers, for that matter.”251 He then 
observed that, “any discussion of pricing issues on list serves is 
generally recognized as potentially anticompetitive and prohibited by 
most moderators.”252 
D. Norvir 
In December 2003, Abbott Laboratories announced a 400 
percent price increase on Norvir (ritonavir), which is used as a 
booster drug for other retrovirals used to treat AIDS.253 Strong and 
vocal opposition to this price increase among doctors and other 
healthcare providers treating persons with HIV culminated in a 
boycott against Abbott.254 In January 2004, eighty HIV healthcare 
providers sent a letter representing a “collective unified agreement 
from all the signatories” regarding their actions “until the ritonavir 
price is undone.”255 The letter stated that the signatories “strongly 
believe in the importance of a profitable and healthy pharmaceutical 
industry market that will stimulate pharmaceutical R&D. . . . [and f]or 
that reason, we would be in favor of your company, and other HIV 
 
Association of Retail Travel Agents, Civ. No. 94-2305 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 24, 1994, entered March 
16, 1995), which was settled without trial. Most importantly, for instant purposes, the point of 
comparison cited by DOJ was a boycott that was strictly economic and involved no expressive 
component. 
 251.  Posting of Peter Banks, Acting Vice President, American Diabetes Organization, 
pbanks@diabetes.org, to liblicense-l@lists.yale.edu (Nov. 11, 2005), available at http://www. 
library.yale.edu/~llicense/ListArchives/0511/msg00094.html. 
 252.  Id. Banks also cites the following language, which is often included in listserv rules: 
“Messages should not be posted if they encourage or facilitate members to arrive at any 
agreement that either expressly or implicitly leads to price fixing, [or] a boycott of another’s 
business . . . .” Id. (citing language from the National Association of Independent Schools). 
 253.  Keith Alcorn, Doctors Rebellion Against Ritonavir Price Increase Spreads in U.S., 
AIDSMAP NEWS, Feb. 11, 2004, http://www.aidsmap.com/en/news/1B319D33-5F3E-4DFA-A3 
DD-0713A64FF0C2.asp. 
 254.  Id. 
 255.  Letter from HIV healthcare providers to Dr. John Leonard, Vice President, Global 
Pharm. Dev., Abbott Labs. (Jan. 20, 2004), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/aids/ 
docs-abbott01202004.html. 
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committed companies, increasing their revenues.”256 Yet they rejected 
the justifications Abbott had offered for this price increase and, 
instead, stated their belief that Abbott’s strategy constitutes “taking 
advantage of a monopolistic situation.”257 The signatories argued that, 
“[a]s gatekeepers, who have been told for the last 20 years that we are 
responsible for keeping medical costs down, we cannot allow this to 
happen.”258 
Until Norvir’s price was lowered, the signatories agreed, among 
other things, to “formally join[] a nationwide boycott” and to take the 
following actions: resign from Abbott advisory boards, stop 
participating in Abbott promotional events or in Abbott-sponsored 
clinical trials, prescribe non-Abbott drugs when alternatives would 
not affect patient care, and actively encourage other physicians and 
organizations to join in these actions.259 In February 2004, leading 
doctors at the Eleventh Conference on Retroviruses and 
Opportunistic Infections announced that the boycott “is now 
supported by more than 200 leading HIV prescribers in the United 
States.”260 One observer commented that this boycott “could signal a 
new brand of militancy among doctors who have been loath to use 
tools of protest more commonly associated with political and social 
activists.”261 Accordingly, if the boycott proved to be an “effective 
mechanism,” there would have been reason to “suspect there’s going 
to be a move of many more physicians across the country to use this 
kind of mechanism to attempt to control drug prices.”262 
The Norvir case, like the academic periodicals example, presents 
a situation in which the boycotters’ effort and influence are not 
restricted to forgoing purchases (writing prescriptions) but extend to 
withholding services from the target firm (supervision of clinical 
trials). Many intellectual property settings involve complex buyer and 
seller relationships in which each party operates, at some level, in 
both roles. Significantly, boycotters’ market power may vary with 
their role. 
 
 256.  Id. 
 257.  Id. 
 258.  Id. 
 259.  Id. 
 260.  Alcorn, supra note 253. 
 261.  Stephen Smith, AIDS Drug’s High Cost Spurs Doctors’ Boycott, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 
19, 2004, at A1. 
 262.  Id. (quoting Kenneth Kaitin, Dir., Tufts Univ. Ctr. for the Study of Drug Dev.). 
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* * * 
The activities that this Article discusses represent, on one level, 
the best of society: the efforts of researchers seeking to cure cancer, 
doctors treating persons with AIDS, and academics and librarians 
facilitating access to research journals. Each group arguably 
undertook, in differing ways and to varying degrees, an expressive 
boycott to promote their respective goals. To those schooled in 
antitrust, however, the collective actions of these boycotters also 
constitute potential violations of the law. Although the wisdom of 
these or comparable boycotts along any number of political, social, or 
economic dimensions may be debated, neither the existence nor the 
content of these debates meaningfully bears upon the antitrust 
implications of the boycotts, with the possible exception of a narrow 
economic inquiry. 
V.  OVERCOMING ANTITRUST OBSTRUCTION 
TO EXPRESSIVE BOYCOTTS 
Part III argued that expressive boycotts combining political and 
economic dimensions should constitute protected speech. The 
judiciary’s failure to accord any First Amendment value to such 
speech is largely attributable to the interaction of an excessively 
categorical approach to identifying speech interests and an economic 
efficiency–based approach to antitrust law that is also unduly narrow 
given the presence of constitutional considerations. This Part 
advocates changes to the current application of antitrust law to 
expressive boycotts that honor the First Amendment values at stake 
and relate them to other important values regarding competition. Part 
V relies upon the boycotts related to intellectual property described 
in Part IV as a useful point of reference. 
The Supreme Court has called the Sherman Antitrust Act “a 
charter of freedom” not only because of the importance of the values 
it seeks to protect but also because it has a “generality and 
adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in 
constitutional provisions.”263 In recent decades that flexibility has 
been directed primarily toward accommodating economics-related 
developments. The recommendations, in contrast, require antitrust to 
demonstrate greater openness with regard to noneconomic 
considerations. 
 
 263.  Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 600 (1936). 
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Under this Article’s proposal, courts would engage in more 
nuanced determinations regarding the existence of protected speech 
interests and, when speech interests are present, apply a modified 
antitrust analysis. The underlying determinations—both factual and 
legal—may be challenging, particularly in cases of first impression. If, 
however, the courts do not unduly restrict their use of general First 
Amendment precedent, they will find that considerable guidance is 
already available and that the adversarial process will produce 
insights on how to apply that precedent. This Article’s proposal 
avoids direct balancing, which is tremendously difficult to implement 
given the ultimate incommensurability of the values underlying the 
First Amendment (speech) and antitrust (economic efficiency). In 
addition to avoiding the direct balancing thicket, this Article’s 
proposal would provide the necessary increased protection for speech 
interests. After presenting its recommendations, this Part discusses 
the most obvious alternative not proposed: the outright immunization 
of expressive boycotts. 
A. Recommendations 
This Article proposes extending limited First Amendment 
protection to expressive boycotts, including those not directed toward 
the government, in which the boycotters’ speech and economic self-
interest are intertwined. When an arguably expressive boycott is at 
issue, the legal analysis addresses three classes of questions. First, 
does a bona fide speech interest exist? If such a speech interest is not 
present, then the boycott receives conventional antitrust analysis. 
Second, is there a conspiracy? Third, is there a competitive harm and, 
if so, what is the likely source of that harm? If such a speech interest 
is present, it operates as a kind of affirmative defense and influences 
the course of the ensuing antitrust analysis, which would deviate from 
more conventional applications.264 The boycotters’ noneconomic as 
well as economic interests must be considered; therefore, the 
threshold antitrust inquiry regarding the presence of a conspiracy 
becomes more complex. This more nuanced treatment of the interests 
at stake necessitates, in turn, a revised competitive effects analysis 
 
 264.  See Deborah A. Garza, DOJ’s New Export-Promotion Policy: Using the Sherman Act 
to Remedy the Exclusion of U.S. Firms from Foreign Markets, ANTITRUST, Fall 1994, at 28, 29 
(characterizing Noerr immunity as an antitrust defense); Joe Sims & Edith E. Scott, Antitrust 
Consequences to Private Parties of Participation in and Settlement of Selected Trade Actions, 56 
ANTITRUST L.J. 561, 588 (1987) (same). 
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and the elimination of per se condemnation. This proposal would 
subject expressive boycotts, such as the three examples of intellectual 
property boycotts which directly implicated pricing—Oncomouse, 
Norvir, and academic journals—to rule of reason analysis. Moreover, 
the same values that necessitate the application of the rule of reason 
also require modification of the rule. The substance of these 
recommendations can be implemented in different ways and to 
different extents by the key actors: the courts, the antitrust agencies, 
and Congress. These recommendations constitute a starting point 
from which First Amendment values can gain greater recognition 
within the context of antitrust assessments of expressive boycotts and, 
perhaps, within antitrust analysis more generally. 
1. Speech Interest.  Under this Article’s proposal, the first step is 
to determine whether the boycotters have a bona fide speech interest 
at stake. The facts instructive on this point could take any number of 
forms. This Section distinguishes boycott characteristics that are 
strongly indicative of a bona fide speech interest from those that 
strongly militate against such a finding. 
Although expressive boycotts defy easy categorization within the 
First Amendment scheme, that framework provides some useful 
points of reference. For example, expressive boycotts are often 
supported by a wide range of speech activities that share important 
features with charitable solicitations and provide evidence regarding 
whether the boycott is expressive or purely coercive. Opining on the 
topic of charitable solicitations, the Supreme Court has recognized 
that they “involve a variety of speech interests—communication of 
information, the dissemination and propagation of views and ideas, 
and the advocacy of causes—that are within the protection of the 
First Amendment.”265 
The presence of a significant effort at public discourse, whether 
directed primarily to a specific community (for example, scientists) or 
to the public at large, is paramount to demonstrating a speech 
interest.266 Thus, demonstrating that boycotters made efforts to 
 
 265.  Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980). 
 266.  As discussed in Part I.A, campaigns directed at the government may constitute 
petitioning and, therefore, receive immunity under Noerr. An important caveat to Noerr 
protection, however, is that it does not extend to all concerted efforts to influence the 
government. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 425 (1990) (citing Allied 
Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc. 486 U.S. 492, 503 (1988)). The Supreme Court has 
rejected, for example, that competitors advocating specific governmental rates or price supports 
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publicly disseminate information about the boycott would be critical 
to establishing a cognizable speech interest. Press releases, petitions, 
and the like could provide this type of evidence. Conversely, efforts 
to maintain secrecy, which typify traditional antitrust conspiracies, 
would undermine finding an expressive purpose. Moreover, those 
involved in conventional conspiracies are unlikely, given the nature of 
their motives, to invite public scrutiny. In addition to the considerable 
legal vulnerability of participants in conventional boycotts, their 
profile as not particularly sympathetic defendants might also 
embolden boycott targets to file suit. 
Examining the nature of the dialogue could provide further 
evidence of the importance of public discourse to the boycott. Does 
the boycott seek to address longstanding or broader social issues? For 
example, the Oncomouse and Cre-lox boycotts, in many regards, 
naturally grew out of the preexisting open science movement, which 
seeks to promote a freer exchange of information.267 Preboycott 
activity supporting similar goals as well as contemporaneous framing 
of the actual boycott in these broader terms further suggests the 
presence of a bona fide expressive purpose.268 
Another factor to consider is the significance or triviality of the 
boycotters’ economic interest. The Court’s ruling fails to address the 
practical matter of what level of economic self-interest is sufficient to 
bar a First Amendment–based defense.269 Conversely, what quantum 
 
can commit horizontal price fixing. See id. FTC Commissioner William Kovacic posits that 
“[h]ad the containment of the per se rule been breached” in Superior Court Trial Lawyers, 
government contractors might have “felt emboldened to act together” and undertake boycotts 
that would then be justified as “political speech necessary to draw attention to threats to the 
public’s wellbeing.” William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Stories, 4 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 241, 260 
(2008) (reviewing ANTITRUST STORIES, supra note 142). Kovacic observes that it is “uncertain” 
whether such boycotters would have been successful in “pulling themselves within the 
protection from per se condemnation that a defendants’ victory in [Superior Court Trial 
Lawyers] might have provided.” Id. This Article addresses expressive boycotts that are directed 
toward the policies of private parties rather than the government. As such, Noerr is unlikely to 
be implicated. With that said, however, those engaging in expressive boycotts directed toward 
the government would be able to argue why they deserve the limited First Amendment 
protection this Article advocates. 
 267.  See, e.g., Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and 
the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 79 (1999) (providing “a comprehensive analysis of 
how law-and-norms theory applies to basic scientific research” given the increasing prevalence 
and relevance of patents in university settings). 
 268.  See, e.g., Hurwitz, supra note 49, at 116; see also supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
 269.  Arguably, the Court’s failure to address this issue stemmed in part from the fact that 
the case at issue seemed relatively straightforward on this score. The boycotters sought a wage 
increase that would largely redound to their own direct benefit. Superior Court Trial Lawyers 
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of economic self-interest is necessary to interpose an antitrust 
challenge? Consider, for example, this Article’s discussion of the 
medical doctors’ boycott of Abbott. The doctors themselves did not 
directly purchase Norvir. They prescribed it to their patients who 
then purchased the drug with or without benefit of insurance. Yet 
there are arguments regarding the doctor-patient relationship and the 
possibility that necessary doctor visits for drug administration or for 
follow-up care created an economic interest on the part of the 
doctors. This example illustrates some of the complexities associated 
with assessing boycotters’ economic interest. 
When a significant number of boycott participants or supporters 
have little or no economic interest in the outcome of the boycott, the 
presence of a speech interest becomes especially likely. In some 
regards, this argument harkens back to the Supreme Court’s ill-
conceived bifurcation of political and economically motivated speech. 
One consequence of the Court’s creation and application of this 
division is that, if one is not economically motivated, then any other 
motivation is deemed political in some sense—or at least worthy of 
First Amendment protection.270 This Article rejects, as the Supreme 
Court has in other cases and contexts,271 the argument that having an 
economic interest is incompatible with having a cognizable speech 
interest worthy of First Amendment protection. Nonetheless, this 
Article recognizes that considering whether expressive boycotts 
appeal to those without economic interests can be instructive. When 
boycotts garner noneconomic supporters, they must involve some 
noneconomic appeal. Such appeal, in turn becomes some evidence of 
political speech. One virtue of this inquiry is that it makes possible 
direct assessment of efforts to communicate with third parties (those 
without direct economic interests) as well as any support offered by 
third parties. 
 
Ass’n v. FTC, 856 F.2d 226, 238 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Moreover, it was of a sufficient magnitude 
such that not only did the protesters abandon their boycott but the number of attorneys seeking 
this work also increased substantially. See id. at 238 n.18 (noting that 100 to 200, rather than 40 
to 60, attorneys call in for cases on a daily basis since the rate increase). Given the range of 
values at stake in expressive boycotts, lower courts would do well to construe only direct and 
substantial economic interests as giving rise to the presumption against any First Amendment 
defense. 
 270.  The dissent recognized that economic interest was not incompatible with the presence 
of protected political expression. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 449 (Brennan, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This Article proposes a more expansive definition 
of protected speech that extends beyond political speech. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 271.  See supra notes 175–78 and accompanying text. 
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The manner in which boycotters participate in the effort might 
also illuminate the role of noneconomic interests. “Boycotts, like 
other instances of collective action, are subject to . . . free-rider 
problems that limit the incentive for participation.”272 If a boycott 
involves large numbers of participants, it is unlikely that those joining 
last are motivated primarily by economic self-interest and, hence, that 
the boycott itself is solely economic in nature. For example, consider 
the incentives of a prospective boycott participant, assuming that the 
prospective participant would bear the same costs and reap the same 
potential benefits as existing participants. As the number of existing 
boycotters increases, the economic incentive for additional 
individuals to participate decreases and eventually becomes quite 
small.273 Joining the boycott would entail the same sacrifice that 
existing participants experience and would have a negligible effect on 
the outcome if there are already a large number of participants. 
Furthermore, because the benefits of a successful boycott would 
extend to nonparticipants, free-riding rather than participation makes 
economic sense. Though the evidence may be difficult to acquire and 
interpret, the participation trajectory characterizing a boycott may 
illuminate its expressive purpose.274 
2. Conspiracy.  The presence of a bona fide speech interest 
increases the complexity of the preliminary, but critical, 
determination regarding conspiracy. In contrast to more conventional 
antitrust settings, conspiracy law’s simplifying assumption of purely 
economic actors may be particularly unsound for the expressive 
boycotts at issue in this Article.275 
 
 272.  John & Klein, supra note 192, at 1197. 
 273.  See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS 34, 45, 53 (1971) (“When the number of participants is large, the typical 
participant will know that his own efforts will probably not make much difference to the 
outcome, and that he will be affected by the meeting’s decision in much the same way no matter 
how much or how little effort he puts into studying the issues.”). 
 274.  In some circumstances, a nontrivial actual benefit (or avoidance of cost) may accrue to 
a boycott member based on boycott participation regardless of the effectiveness of the boycott 
on its target. For example, participants may benefit from solidarity with the other members of 
the boycott. For a discussion of solidarity, see supra Part III.B.2. If such considerations are the 
dominant reasons for boycott participation, participation without economic interest would not 
be sufficient to establish a bona fide speech interest. Further difficult antitrust issues, beyond 
the scope of this Article, are raised if boycott participation is coerced by a subgroup through 
social or economic threats. 
 275.  See supra Part I.B.1. 
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How would a court analyze a situation in which there was an 
appeal for a boycott and the boycott lacked a concrete “agreement”? 
The Seventh Circuit considered that issue within the context of a 
NOW-sponsored boycott of Missouri’s convention industry 
undertaken to pressure the state to support the Equal Rights 
Amendment.276 The court found that “the invitation to act, the 
presence of a strong motive for concerted action, and the knowledge 
that others were taking similar action are sufficient to find conspiracy 
under the Sherman Act.”277 This rather straightforward application of 
antitrust common law renders de minimis the conspiracy 
requirement. As a practical matter, it also means that much of the 
same evidence that could give rise to some claim for protected 
expression (such as a public appeal to boycott) could also facilitate 
finding that a conspiracy existed. 
When the existence of an agreement is at issue, one particularly 
important antitrust inquiry concerns whether, but for similar actions 
by the alleged coconspirators, it would have been contrary to the 
interest of any individual participant to undertake the action in 
question. Within a conventional antitrust setting, this determination is 
relatively straightforward given that self-interest is assessed in strictly 
economic terms. The seminal case on this issue, Interstate Circuit, Inc. 
v. United States,278 involved a film exhibitor who sent a letter to eight 
of its distributors requesting compliance with the exhibitor’s 
restrictions on certain third parties.279 The letter “named on its face as 
addresses the eight local representatives of the distributors” so that 
each distributor knew that the competing distributors were 
considering the same proposal.280 Each was aware that “without 
substantially unanimous action” regarding the proposal, any 
individual participant would risk “substantial loss,” but with 
“concerted action” there was the prospect of achieving increased 
profits.281 The unanimous but technically individual responses of the 
distributors were deemed to constitute an agreement and, ultimately, 
 
 276.  Missouri v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 620 F.2d 1301, 1302 (8th Cir. 1980). For a 
discussion of the case, see supra Part II.B. 
 277.  Id. at 1303 (citing Missouri v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 289, 296 
(1979)). 
 278.  Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939). 
 279.  Id. at 216. 
 280.  Id. at 222. 
 281.  Id. 
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their conduct was condemned under the antitrust laws.282 Most 
important for instant purposes is the Court’s holding that “[i]t was 
enough that, knowing that concerted action was contemplated and 
invited, the distributors gave their adherence to the scheme and 
participated in it. Each distributor was advised that the others were 
asked to participate; each knew that cooperation was essential to 
successful operation of the plan.”283 
Given the expressive boycotts at issue in this Article, an alleged 
conspirator may have individually refused to deal with the target as a 
matter of principle under any circumstance.284 Assessing actions 
against self-interest is difficult when the boycotters’ interests are more 
complex than narrow economic gain. If an alleged conspirator would 
have engaged in the same conduct regardless of the alleged 
coconspirators’ actions, it does not mean that no conspiracy exists. It 
does mean, however, that the inference of a conspiracy should not be 
conclusive.285 In these boycott settings, it is also possible that peer or 
social pressure might act as an inducement or enforcement 
mechanism imposing costs on individuals who refuse to join the 
boycott.286 
Assessment of the existence of an alleged conspiracy can occur 
not only on the basis of evaluating the incentives of individual 
participants but also through more comprehensively evaluating the 
overall economics underlying the conspiracy. For example, “if the 
hallmarks of profitable economic conspiracies” are missing, then 
“greater credence [should be accorded] to assertions that the 
boycott’s purpose is political [or noneconomic].”287 The “economic 
 
 282.  Id. at 232. 
 283.  Id. at 226. 
 284.  Boycotting as a form of “protest behavior is also in itself expressive, value-based 
conduct, independent of the pressure [the boycotters] impose. The boycotter affirms that under 
present conditions she considers purchases from or interactions with the boycotted party to be 
objectionable.” C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 189 (1989). 
 285.  See, e.g., Note, Political Boycott Activity and the First Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 
659, 689 (1978) (An individual who boycotts for political reasons “may be indifferent to whether 
others pursue a similar course of action” or the individual may boycott “only if he believes 
others will do so the same, so that the combined protest will have some practical effect.”). 
 286.  See, e.g., Posting of Scott Aaronson to Freedom to Tinker, http://freedom-to-tinker. 
com/blog/felten/journal-algorithms-editorial-board-revolts (Feb. 9, 2004, 12:38 EST) (“A few 
days ago I refused to referee for the Elsevier journal Theoretical Computer Science because of 
its price-gouging, and (call it peer pressure if you want) it makes me feel better that others are 
making a similar decision.”). 
 287.  Hurwitz, supra note 49, at 115. Hurwitz aptly notes, however, that “the converse of this 
reasoning does not hold true with equal force.” Id. The presence of market conditions 
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indicia of a profitable boycott” include factors that “increase[e] the 
potential gains from the boycott, assist[] in its coordination, [and] 
reduce[] incentives to cheat.”288 
Within conventional antitrust cases, the conspiracy requirement 
has been periodically applied in a “flexible” manner so that courts are 
not unduly prevented from “reaching the competitive merits” of the 
conduct at issue.289 Although this flexibility has been reflected in 
courts’ increased willingness to find a conspiracy, this Article 
proposes that it should also be applied to expressive boycotts to 
account for the value and realities of group speech and, thereby, 
properly diminish a court’s willingness to so liberally find an antitrust 
conspiracy.290 
3. Competitive Harm.  Just as the existence of a speech interest 
should be discerned from the facts at issue rather than from 
mechanical categorization, so too should competitive harm be 
assessed by evaluating the facts rather than by resorting to per se 
rules. Expressive boycotts should never be condemned per se. 
Instead, this Article proposes that all boycotts characterized by a 
bona fide speech interest, whether traditionally subject to per se 
illegality or rule of reason analysis, should be analyzed under a 
modified rule of reason approach establishing a competitive harm and 
reflecting the unique circumstances and values at stake. An important 
component of this proposal is that proof of an actual economic harm 
is not sufficient for antitrust liability. There must also be evidence 
that economic coercion was sufficient to cause this harm. As such, 
boycotts whose efficacy derives primarily from persuasion rather than 
economic coercion do not run afoul of the antitrust laws. 
The rationale underlying per se condemnation of particular 
conduct is that anticompetitive effects are probable and 
procompetitive effects are extremely unlikely.291 Per se illegality’s 
automatic condemnation cannot, by design, result in false negatives 
 
conducive to effective collusion should not be interpreted to imply that the boycott constitutes 
“unlawful economic coercion” rather than legitimate expression. Id. 
 288.  Id. (summarizing the conditions Posner and Easterbrook associate with effective 
collusion). 
 289.  SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 51, at 456. 
 290.  Note, supra note 285, at 691 (advocating, within the political boycott context, that 
“courts define conspiracy narrowly and insist that it be proven by more direct means than are 
often used in antitrust prosecutions in the commercial area”). 
 291.  See supra Part I.B. 
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and is unlikely to result in true false positives (meaning the 
procompetitive effects would outweigh the anticompetitive effects). If 
antitrust law is to account for the social benefit of the speech 
involved, something more akin to a rule of reason analysis becomes 
necessary.292 Without more nuanced inquiry than per se analysis 
provides, antitrust law would condemn expressive boycotts that 
contribute to public discourse but do not inflict competitive harm. 
Valuing speech in a manner consistent with the Constitution 
increases the possibility of false positives within this context, and this 
possibility should be avoided. Of course, in the absence of a per se 
rule, false negatives are possible. Two factors, however, militate 
against the latter prospect being unduly concerning. First, this Article 
advocates a modified rule of reason treatment for expressive boycotts 
as opposed to per se legality.293 As such, antitrust scrutiny will be 
brought to bear and anticompetitive restraints will be condemned. 
Second, on the margin, allowing anticompetitive conduct with an 
intertwined speech interest to persist reflects a social value judgment 
regarding the respective weights of society’s interests in eliminating 
anticompetitive conduct and protecting free speech. 
The existence of a speech interest would not only affect per se 
actions but would also necessitate modifying the rule of reason. 
Changes to the rule of reason should include reforming the way that 
competitive harm is identified and crafting a safety zone. As this 
Article has discussed, anticompetitive effects can be established 
directly through evidence of actual harm or indirectly through market 
power. 294 In a traditional antitrust setting, a target’s price reduction in 
reponse to boycott demands constitutes the most obvious evidence of 
actual harm. Under the conventional rule of reason analysis, this price 
change would typically constitute prima facie evidence establishing 
competitive harm. In such a case, if the effect on the market (such as 
 
 292. The dissent in Superior Court Trial Lawyers advocated application of the rule of reason 
to the expressive boycott at issue in that case. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 
U.S. 411, 439 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dissent neither 
recognized nor contended with the unique challenges that applying the rule of reason in a 
conventional manner would raise. 
 293. Consistent with the conventional rule of reason, boycotters who have inflicted 
competitive harm could, in theory, also attempt to demonstrate offsetting procompetitive 
effects. This proposal does not eliminate the ability to make such arguments. The existence of a 
speech interest, however, would not factor into that balancing test. 
 294.  See supra Part I.B.3–4. 
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a change in price or quantity of a good) is attributed to the 
conspiracy, it is presumed to be a function of economic coercion.295 
But expressive boycotts, by design, seek to generate pressure 
through public shaming or reputation degradation that need not 
contribute to the direct coercive effects of a concerted refusal to buy. 
“[B]oycotts need not substantially reduce sales to be successful. Firms 
may comply with boycott demands in response to the moral pressure 
and concern for the firm’s reputation, even absent any impact on 
sales.”296 The negative publicity attendant to a boycott can “engender 
a negative image that penetrates . . . [the minds of current and 
prospective company staff].”297 As a result, companies may, for 
example, encounter obstacles in “recruitment of high-quality 
graduates” and in maintaining morale among existing employees.298 
“Employees don’t like working for a company that is being 
attacked.”299 Thus, the legitimacy of the conventional antitrust 
presumption that market effects originate from economic coercion 
becomes uncertain in the case of expressive boycotts. 
Expressive boycotts raise the issue of whether established 
boycott concessions were generated by persuasion or economic 
coercion, a difficult assessment that is further complicated in the 
context of expressive boycotts because some combination of those 
two forces may also be present. Superior Court Trial Lawyers is the 
only antitrust case that has directly addressed the cause of 
concessions by a boycott target. Over the course of its numerous 
proceedings, different jurists came to divergent conclusions regarding 
the forces at play. The ALJ found that “there is no credible evidence 
that the [target’s] eventual capitulation to the demands of 
[boycotters] was made in response to public pressure, or, for that 
matter, that [the] publicity campaign actually engendered any 
significant measure of public pressure.”300 Justices Brennan and 
Marshall found that “the success of the boycott could have been 
 
 295.  These effects may be difficult to establish given that price and nonprice characteristics 
of goods and services vary with changes in the economic environment (excluding the boycott), 
with decisions to alter a firm’s strategy, and possibly even for reasons relating to pending or 
anticipated litigation. 
 296.  Klein et al., supra note 8, at 7. 
 297.  Scott Clouder & Rob Harrison, The Effectiveness of Ethical Consumer Behaviour, in 
THE ETHICAL CONSUMER 89, 96 (Rob Harrison et al. eds., 2005). 
 298.  Id. 
 299.  Id. 
 300.  FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 416–17 (1990). 
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attributable to the persuasiveness of its message rather than any 
coercive economic force.”301 Given these diverse assessments, the 
question becomes: To what extent can courts directly identify the 
impetus for the target’s price change? Relatively little legal guidance 
is available on this issue because neither the expressive aspect of such 
boycotts nor the possibility of persuasion is currently recognized. 
By replacing per se condemnation with a modified rule of reason, 
this Article’s proposal allows for judicial recognition of a boycott’s 
possible expressive purpose. Alleged anticompetitive effects are 
treated differently depending on whether or not actual economic 
effects are established. Claims of actual competitive harm will 
frequently be relatively easy to allege if the expressive boycotts entail 
concessions by the target firm.302 In such cases, the plaintiff would be 
required to demonstrate that the boycotters’ withholding of 
purchasing power was sufficiently coercive to generate the target 
firm’s response.303 Confining the cognizable antitrust effect in this 
manner requires distinguishing between the effects attributable to 
economic coercion versus persuasion. This Article designates general 
economic effects resulting from boycotts as “actual effects” and 
reserves the term “actual anticompetitive effects” for those effects 
resulting from economic coercion. 
Market share that confers market power already functions as a 
surrogate for anticompetitive effects when there are no directly 
observable actual effects. This Article proposes that a similar type of 
approach can also help determine, with certain limitations, whether 
or not the source of ostensible actual anticompetitive effects is 
persuasion rather than economic coercion.304 Under this proposal, the 
following market power thresholds would guide the determination of 
anticompetitive effects. A market share below 10 percent would 
constitute a safety zone. Boycotts of this size would be deemed 
presumptively insufficient to result in antitrust liability even when an 
“actual effect,” though of unknown provenance, has been 
 
 301.  Id. at 441 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 302.  John & Klein, supra note 192, at 1197. 
 303.  A weaker version of this proposal would permit expressive boycotters to proffer a 
defense of insufficient market power. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 138, at 196 
(“[P]rosecution in . . . speech-conduct case[s] could be adequately blunted by a special rule 
allowing the defendants to prove their de minimis market power.”). 
 304.  See Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n v. FTC, 856 F.2d 222, 252 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 
(discussing the difficulty of discerning competitive effects). 
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established.305 If there is an “actual market effect,” again of unknown 
provenance, and the boycotters enjoy 20 percent or more of the 
relevant antitrust market, however induced, then the market effect 
would be presumed to result from direct coercion. 
In the absence of an actual market effect, the rule of reason 
analysis would proceed along conventional lines. Under those 
circumstances, the plaintiff would need to establish a minimum 
market share on the order of at least 35 to 50 percent to demonstrate 
market power.306 The safety zone would be retained, however, and 
particularly within this context it should be considered whether the 10 
percent threshold should be increased in cases in which no actual 
effect is alleged. 
These thresholds could be implemented in a number of ways. By 
case-by-case determinations, over time the courts would generate 
piecemeal specific baselines. When making case-specific 
determinations, individual judges can offer, in dicta, more general 
baselines. Consider, for example, Judge Learned Hand’s famous, and 
often cited, articulation in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America 
that a market share of “over ninety . . . is enough to constitute a 
monopoly; it is doubtful whether sixty . . . percent would be enough; 
and certainly thirty-three per cent is not.”307 Another, far less likely 
possibility would be the promulgation of an enforcement guideline by 
the antitrust agencies within this area that retreats from the FTC’s 
hard-fought win in Superior Court Trial Lawyers. Although legally 
nonbinding, agency enforcement guidelines often exert a powerful 
influence over the judiciary.308 Additionally, Congress could enact 
legislation that either excludes expressive boycotts from the reach of 
the Sherman Act or moderates the manner in which the Sherman Act 
is applied.309 Though, for the same reasons that Congress opted to 
 
 305.  Alternatively, one could establish different thresholds for situations that previously 
would have been given per se treatment as opposed to rule of reason treatment. 
 306.  See Andrew I. Gavil, Copperweld 2000: The Vanishing Gap Between Sections 1 and 2 
of the Sherman Act, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 87, 103–04 (2000). The proposed 20 percent threshold 
when a market effect is present, as opposed to the 35 to 50 percent in the absence of a market 
effect, illustrates that the “inference of market power drawn from direct evidence is given far 
greater weight than any circumstantial evidence based on market shares.” Id. at 99. 
 307.  United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 308.  See generally Greene, supra note 83, at 781–809 (delineating and criticizing the impact 
of merger guidelines upon the judiciary). 
 309.  The 1970 Newspaper Preservation Act, which seeks to maintain “a newspaper press 
editorially and reportorially independent and competitive in all parts of the United States,” 
constitutes an example of congressional intervention regarding antitrust. 15 U.S.C. § 1801 
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enact the extremely general Sherman Antitrust Act, it is also unlikely 
to produce highly detailed legislation within this context.310 
The physician-led Abbott boycott illustrates the potential 
significance of market share thresholds in antitrust analysis. By most 
accounts, Abbott partially abandoned the 400 percent price increase 
that prompted the boycott.311 Under this Article’s proposal, even 
partial accommodation of boycott demands would not constitute 
prima facie evidence of actual anticompetitive effect. An examination 
of the marketplace into which Abbott sold its drugs would very likely 
reveal that the couple hundred doctors who signed the petition stating 
that they refused to prescribe Abbott drugs (when true substitutes 
were available) enjoyed no real power in this market.312 As such, this 
could well represent the type of boycott that would fall within this 
Article’s proposed safety zone. One might also attempt to cast the 
relevant market as that in which Abbott “purchases” physician 
services for clinical trials or, more specifically, clinical trials of AIDS 
drugs. In those circumstances, the boycotters’ market power (as 
sellers) likely exceeds that under the prior market definition (as 
buyers). It would remain necessary, though, to determine whether the 
boycotters possessed sufficient market power to infer an 
anticompetitive effect. Extremely involved inquiries of this type are 
routinely undertaken in antitrust matters to avoid unnecessarily 
condemning procompetitive conduct. First Amendment rights 
warrant, at the least, comparable solicitude.313 
 
(1970). The act, which was “passed in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizen 
Publishing Co. v. United States,” provides an exemption to the antitrust laws. Denise W. 
DeFranco, Administrative Law: Chevron and Canons of Statutory Construction, 58 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 829, 832 (1990) (footnote omitted). 
 310. William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the “Common 
Law” Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661, 663 (1982) (“The antitrust laws were 
written with awareness of the diversity of business conduct and with the knowledge that the 
detailed statutes which would prohibit socially undesirable conduct would lack the flexibility 
needed to encourage (and at times even permit) desirable conduct. To provide this flexibility, 
Congress adopted what is in essence enabling legislation that has permitted a common-law 
refinement of antitrust law through an evolution guided by only the most general statutory 
directions.”). 
 311.  See Alcorn, supra note 253 (describing Abbott’s concessions, including selective price 
reductions to levels prior to the controversial price hike). 
 312.  See Francine Knowles, Doctors Boycott Abbott over Price Hike for AIDS Drug, CHI. 
SUN-TIMES, Feb. 11, 2004, at 75 (noting that boycotters “represent fewer than 2 percent of 
physicians who treat AIDS patients”). 
 313.  See Kindred, supra note 141, at 723 (advocating “the kind of broad-based factual 
inquiry that the rule of reason affords” within this boycott context). 
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Predictability in the law is always an important value. This is 
even more true when “the inevitable caution that unpredictability 
yields will induce self-censorship (‘chilling’) of that which may very 
well be important.”314 Although the current legal regime, as a practical 
matter, arguably offers greater First Amendment predictability 
regarding expressive boycotts than this Article’s proposal, that is only 
because “predictability” in this context also encompasses the 
certainty of little or no protection. The recommendations in this 
Article provide significant guidance regarding First Amendment 
protections of expressive boycotts and, given their heavy reliance 
upon antitrust policy and precedent, provide vital consistency from a 
competition perspective. 
B. Nonrecommendations 
The approach advocated by this Article, consistent with the 
Superior Court Trial Lawyers dissent, takes the form of an 
unconventional accommodation. Rather than recommend either 
wide-ranging or zero immunity, this Article recommends antitrust 
immunity for a range of boycotts when two conditions are met: the 
presence of more than a bona fide speech interest and the absence of 
market power. 315 If those two conditions do not hold, then 
conventional antitrust analysis, including possible per se 
condemnation, applies. This final Section considers, and rejects, 
modifying the two prongs of the proposed standard in a manner that 
would further expand First Amendment protection. 
Should speech protection be further enhanced by eliminating the 
market power exception to immunity?316 Consider an immunization 
 
 314.  Schauer, supra note 41, at 299. 
 315.  For all of their differences, the majority and dissent in Superior Court Trial Lawyers 
agreed that the expressive boycott was not entitled to immunity under the First Amendment. 
The dissent clearly deemed the boycott to be a “political communication.” Given the boycott’s 
potential for economic coercion, however, the dissent refused to render the boycott “immune 
from scrutiny.” FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 448 (1990) (Brennan, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In so doing, the dissent transcended the majority’s 
unsuccessful efforts to deny the expressive component of the boycott. By relying on O’Brien, 
the dissent demonstrated a willingness to “balance First Amendment interests implicated by the 
facts of [the] case.” Jerome A. Barron, The Electronic Media and the Flight from First 
Amendment Doctrine: Justice Breyer’s New Balancing Approach, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 817, 819 
n.12 (1998) (emphasis added). 
 316.  Noerr is generally referred to interchangeably as a defense or as an immunity. See 
Russell Wofford, Considering the “Pattern Litigation” Exception to the Noerr-Pennington 
Antitrust Defense, 49 WAYNE L. REV. 95, 98 n.10 (2003). This Part has proposed a First 
Amendment–based defense/immunity which operates to modify the applicable antitrust 
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approach that requires only a minimal showing of a speech interest. 
Given such a powerful defense, potential boycotters lacking any 
underlying speech interest might be induced to undertake a public 
boycott incorporating a speech component. If such “feigned” speech 
were readily identified and excluded from First Amendment 
protection, this prospect would not be troubling.317 It is more likely, 
however, that distinguishing sham from bona fide speech interests will 
prove exceedingly difficult. Within the Noerr context where, for 
example, similar determinations regarding litigation must be made, 
the courts have adopted an extremely low threshold, comparable to 
Rule 11 analysis under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for what 
constitutes bona fide litigation.318 An alternative mechanism for 
making this assessment would inquire into the litigant’s motivations, 
but the Supreme Court has affirmatively rejected the relevance of 
motivation unless the action is objectively baseless.319 
Despite the Court’s reluctance to engage in the analysis of 
motivation in the related Noerr context, analysis of motivation has 
been used elsewhere in antitrust law—for example, through the use of 
a “but for” analysis to assess the existence of a conspiracy. Here, a 
“but for” approach could possibly be used to help determine whether 
boycott speech is feigned or real. As this Article has argued, the level 
of engagement in public discourse is a possible indicator that the 
boycott was expressive. In theory, then, to determine whether the 
boycott speech was feigned, one could examine whether such public 
discourse would have been undertaken absent the prospect of 
immunity. Given the Superior Court Trial Lawyers ruling, however, 
this “but for” immunity argument sweeps far too broadly. Presently, 
many potential boycotters with an economic interest who fear 
antitrust actions would be reluctant to undertake boycotts and risk 
antitrust condemnation. In practice, therefore, all such boycotters, 
even those with bona fide speech interests, would be more likely to 
engage in such expressive conduct if antitrust immunity were 
 
analysis. This Section considers alternative standards that are so protective of speech that they 
are referred to loosely in terms of immunity for emphasis. 
 317.  The Supreme Court has long held that “First Amendment rights may not be used as 
the means or the pretext for achieving ‘substantive evils’ which the legislature has the power to 
control.” California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 515 (1972) (citation 
omitted). 
 318.  See, e.g., Lisa Wood, In Praise of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, ANTITRUST, Fall 
2003, at 72, 73 (noting the similarity between Noerr’s exception for sham litigation and Rule 11). 
 319.  Prof’l Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures, 508 U.S. 49, 59–60 (1993) (stating 
that motivation is irrelevant if the litigation is objectively reasonable). 
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available.320 If all, or nearly all, boycotts involved speech induced on 
some level by the prospect of antitrust immunity, then a “but for” 
approach would constitute a poor screen. 
A somewhat less aggressive alternative to full immunization 
when a boycott involves a bona fide speech interest would be to grant 
immunity (without considering market power) when a boycott’s 
speech interest is deemed “significant,” however defined. Relative to 
the bona fide speech standard advocated, which merely requires more 
than a de minimis interest, a more aggressive partitioning of 
expressive boycotts seems much more difficult to implement, more 
prone to chilling speech, and open to criticism as arbitrary absent 
some clear principle justifying a further subcategorization of which 
speech warrants protection. While it is possible that such a principle 
might be developed and applied to this context, the history of 
attempts to make principled distinctions of this type in the First 
Amendment area underscores the difficulty of such an enterprise. 
Under this Article’s proposal, which advocates application of a 
modified rule of reason, the problem of feigned expressive boycotts 
that seems particularly troubling under full immunization is 
significantly mitigated. By focusing on the economic consequences of 
market conduct, rule of reason analysis protects the speech interests 
of boycotters who lack market power and cause no antitrust harm. 
The risk of feigning speech to limit antitrust liability is potentially 
very high to conspirators because exposing the existence of a 
conspiracy increases the probability of an antitrust action. For those 
whose underlying speech interest is most tenuous, this increased 
probability is also relatively more risky as, in the case of price fixing, a 
prosecuted conspiracy still risks per se treatment. Furthermore, 
 
 320.  It is possible to develop a different baseline than current law for the “but for” 
immunity comparison. One natural candidate for such a baseline is that in which identified 
group boycotts are vulnerable to antitrust sanction only if they adversely affect competition. 
Without immunity being available, a group boycott with sufficient market power to force target 
concessions would not likely engage in (unneeded) public discourse, which would greatly 
increase the risk associated with discovery and prosecution. With immunity, however, those 
boycotters would likely engage in public discourse and shield their boycott. On the other hand, 
a boycott that lacks market power but includes a bona fide speech interest would engage in 
public discourse, even without immunity, since the boycott would not be vulnerable to an 
antitrust sanction given this alternative baseline for the “but for” assessment. Immunity would 
also be attractive to this class of boycotters (no market power), but the speech activities would 
have been undertaken without the possibility of immunity. This approach effectively recreates a 
market power–based categorization similar to this Article’s proposal, but with additional 
complications associated with assessing motivation and dealing with conspirators that have 
heterogeneous preferences. 
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disingenuous boycotters risk a public backlash should their subterfuge 
be exposed. In sum, even when antitrust leniency immunizes feigned 
boycotts, the costs of such errors are cabined under this proposal. 
Only boycotters without market power will avoid liability, but they 
are precisely the group that does not threaten antitrust harm. 
* * * 
Expressive boycotts by politically motivated and economically 
interested parties constitute the type of undertaking that can be 
meaningfully assessed under both the First Amendment and the 
Sherman Act so long as neither regime resorts to overly simplistic 
analysis. The First Amendment (with the introduction of 
intermediate scrutiny and O’Brien balancing) and the Sherman Act 
(with an increasing reliance upon the rule of reason) are well 
equipped to provide the more nuanced analysis required. As Superior 
Court Trial Lawyers illustrated with regard to the First Amendment, 
once a court unnecessarily restricts itself to an all-or-nothing type of 
analysis, “the difficulties of ‘all’ [immunizing speech] may lead courts 
to choose ‘nothing.’”321 As this Article has demonstrated, however, 
the courts need not restrict themselves in that manner. A vital form of 
intermediate First Amendment protection is available through 
O’Brien and can be meaningfully accommodated through antitrust 
law’s adoption of a modified rule of reason. Stated alternatively, 
antitrust law need not adopt an all-or-nothing perspective regarding 
its own ability to accommodate noneconomic factors such as speech. 
Through recommendations as well as nonrecommendations, this 
Article demonstrates how the law could strike a superior balance 
between First Amendment and competition values despite their 
inherent incommensurability. 
CONCLUSION 
Expressive boycotts combine speech with economic coercion or, 
more specifically, the potential for such coercion, and present a 
difficult challenge to current antitrust and First Amendment law. The 
Supreme Court’s response in Superior Court Trial Lawyers, the 
controlling precedent on this issue, effectively rejects the argument 
 
 321.  Schauer, supra note 41, at 286. Schauer argues that in the absence of some form of 
intermediate First Amendment protection both commercial speech and defamation were 
deemed “outside first amendment protection.” Id. 
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that economically self-interested boycotters have speech interests 
worthy of First Amendment protection. Ironically, it is oftentimes 
precisely these parties who are most knowledgeable about and 
committed to the social and community issues at stake. The unique 
features of a boycott in engendering social discourse coupled with the 
frequent absence of any underlying market power renders antitrust 
condemnation, or even discouragement, of these efforts dubious from 
an economic perspective as well as unconstitutional. After closely 
examining the precursors to Superior Court Trial Lawyers to 
underscore the longstanding biases of both First Amendment and 
antitrust law made manifest in that ruling, this Article concludes that 
ensuring adequate protection of expressive boycotts requires reforms 
in both areas of law. 
Whatever one’s ultimate assessment regarding the merits of the 
intellectual property–related boycotts discussed, they were expressive 
undertakings and not merely conventional concerted refusals to deal. 
This Article recommends more lenient antitrust treatment of boycotts 
involving a speech interest. Under this proposal, all expressive 
boycotts would receive a modified rule of reason treatment, and 
cognizable market effects would be limited to those directly resulting 
from the boycotters’ economic power. Additionally, market power 
thresholds, particularly a safety zone, would assist the courts in 
accommodating these incommensurate values. This balanced 
approach would be more difficult to implement than either per se 
condemnation or complete immunity, but it would end antitrust law’s 
unwarranted censorship of expressive boycotts. 
